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Ted Kaczynski and Bernie Madoff share much in common.  Both are well-educated, 
extremely intelligent, charismatic figures.  Both rose to the height of their chosen 
professions—mathematics and finance.  And both will die in federal prison, 
Kaczynski for committing a twenty-year mail-bombing spree that killed three people and 
seriously injured dozens more and Madoff for committing the largest Ponzi scheme in 
history, bilking thousands of people out of almost $65 billion.  But that last 
similarity—Kaczynski’s and Madoff’s plight at sentencing—may not have had to be.  
While Kaczynski’s attorneys tirelessly investigated and argued every aspect of their 
client’s personal history, mental state, motivations, and sentencing options, Madoff’s 
attorneys offered almost nothing to mitigate his conduct, simply accepting his fate at 
sentencing.  In the end, Kaczynski’s attorneys were able to convince the government, 
the court, and their client that a life sentence was appropriate despite that he 
committed one of the most heinous and well-publicized death penalty-eligible crimes in 
recent history.  Madoff, on the other hand, with almost unlimited resources at his 
disposal, received effectively the same sentence—150 years in prison—for a nonviolent 
offense.  Why were these two men ultimately given the same sentence?  And what can 
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Madoff, the financier with unimaginable wealth, learn from Kaczynski, the reclusive 
and remorseless killer, when it comes to federal sentencing? 
The answer lies in how attorneys use sentencing mitigation strategies.  This Article 
contends that federal white collar defendants and their attorneys have failed to 
effectively use mitigation strategies to lessen sentences, resulting in unnecessarily long 
prison terms for nonviolent offenders committing financial crimes.  The white collar 
defense bar has inexplicably ignored the mitigation techniques perfected by capital 
defense attorneys, and in the process has failed to effectively represent its clients.  After 
discussing the development of the mitigation function in capital cases and paralleling 
it with the evolution of white collar sentencing jurisprudence, particularly post-
Booker, this Article will present seven key mitigation strategies currently used by 
capital defense teams and discuss how these strategies might be employed in federal 
white collar cases.  The goal throughout this Article will be to highlight new strategies 
and techniques available in defending white collar clients and to enhance sentencing 
advocacy in federal criminal cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who watched television, listened to the radio, or read a 
newspaper during the late 1990s is likely familiar with the 
“Unabomber” crime saga.  Ted Kaczynski, a Harvard-educated math 
genius and one-time Berkeley professor, gave up his life as a 
promising academic and moved to the woods in rural Lincoln, 
Montana.1  There, he built his own home—the infamous shack2—
and lived off “what he could grow or kill,” shunning the 
technological world of computers, electricity, and even running 
water.3  Although he held odd jobs at various times, Kaczynski 
apparently lived on just a few hundred dollars a year.4  His primary 
vocation was “the disruption of the industrial society he had left 
behind.”5  And in that endeavor he was successful.  Over an almost 
twenty year period, from May 1978 until his arrest in April 1996, 
Kaczynski killed three people and injured twenty-nine others.6  The 
tools of his destruction were always the same:  package bombs sent to 
individuals and companies he targeted as “techno-nerds . . . changing 
the world.”7 
The manhunt for the Unabomber reached its crescendo in April 
1996, when agents stormed Kaczynski’s cabin and arrested the target 
of what had become the longest and most expensive manhunt for a 
serial killer in U.S. history.8  Federal agents were led to Kaczynski by 
an unlikely source:  his own 35,000-word manifesto on the “evil of 
                                                            
 1. For a detailed account of the events leading to Kaczynski’s capture, see 
generally Robert D. McFadden, Prisoner of Rage—A Special Report:  From a Child of 
Promise to the Unabom Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1996/05/26/us/prisoner-of-rage-a-special-report-from-a-child-of-promise-to-the-
unabom-suspect.html?pagewanted=all. 
 2. Kaczynski’s ten-by-twelve-foot plywood cabin is now a permanent exhibit at 
the Newseum in Washington, D.C.  See Jacqueline Trescott, Unabomber Objects to 
Newseum’s Exhibit, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081202660.html. 
 3. See Nancy Gibbs, Unabomber:  Tracking Down the Unabomber, TIME (Apr. 15, 
1996), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984392,00.html 
 (describing the desolate location that Kaczynski called home). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Adam K. Magid, The Unabomber Revisited:  Reexamining the Use of Mental 
Disorder Diagnoses as Evidence of the Mental Condition of Criminal Defendants, 84 IND. L.J. 
SUPP. 1, 2 (2009), http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/84/84_Magid.pdf (describing 
how one of Kaczynski’s victims lost sight in one eye, hearing in one ear, and part of 
his hand); see also William Booth, Kaczynski Resists the Insanity Defense, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/aron/ 
kaczynski122697.htm (providing further summary of Kazcynski’s crimes). 
 7. Gibbs, supra note 3; see also Magid, supra note 6, at 2 (describing targets that 
included computer scientists, airline passengers, and a high-profile advertising 
executive). 
 8. Gibbs, supra note 3. 
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modern technology” published in the Washington Post.9  Kaczynski’s 
brother recognized his writing and directed the FBI to the Montana 
shack, where agents found writings, bomb-making tools, and 
“signature” components identifying the Unabomber’s handiwork.10  
Kaczynski’s bearded, half-mad face was splashed across cable news in 
an infinite loop, and he was instantly labeled a brilliant and deadly 
sociopath.11 
Kaczynski’s arrest was just the beginning of the saga.  Over the next 
two years, he battled lawyers (the government’s and his own), judges, 
psychiatrists, and the legal system itself, fighting to defend himself as 
a sane man in order to profess his seemingly insane view of the 
world—a view that justified his crimes as part of a greater good to 
protect society against the evils of technology.12  In the end, Kaczynski 
accepted a plea agreement on the eve of trial in exchange for the 
prosecution’s assurance to not seek the death penalty.13  He was 
sentenced to four life sentences plus thirty years.14  There is no doubt 
Kaczynski will die in federal prison. 
But while the details of Kaczynski’s arrest and almost-trial may be 
well-known, what is less understood is the role his lawyers played in 
sparing him from a death sentence.  As one expert capital litigator 
has said: 
Kaczynski’s guilty plea to avoid a death sentence was . . . dependent 
on tireless mitigation investigation . . . .  The Unabomber case is an 
important reminder that the development of mitigation evidence 
may be as critical to resolving cases through successful dispositions 
as to winning life sentences before juries.15 
                                                            
 9. Magid, supra note 6, at 2 (detailing how Kaczynski originally contacted the 
New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle, offering to stop sending bombs if the 
papers published his writings; the Washington Post ultimately published the 
manifesto). 
 10. See Gibbs, supra note 3 (describing how “[e]very bombmaker . . . develops a 
hallmark:  he may loop wires in a certain way, or set his switches at a certain angle or, 
in this case, create his contraptions out of wood”). 
 11. See id. (reporting that Ken Thompson, a former FBI agent and domestic 
terrorism expert, mused that “[t]he boys in the basement at Quantico are going to 
spend years studying this case”). 
 12. See William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 
52, 57 (explaining that Kaczynski’s Manifesto “urged revolution in the name of Wild 
Nature”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. David Johnston, Judge Sentences Confessed Bomber to Four Life Terms, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/05/us/judge-sentences-confessed-
bomber-to-four-life-terms.html. 
 15. Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 
1999, at 35, 36 n.1 [hereinafter Stetler, Mitigation Evidence]. 
HAUGH.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:54 PM 
2012] CAN THE CEO LEARN FROM THE CONDEMNED? 5 
Kaczynski benefitted from the expertise of a team of veteran capital 
litigators and mitigation experts who spent hundreds of hours 
constructing a sympathetic life story, which included compiling 
extensive evidence of Kaczynski’s mental impairment, paranoid 
schizophrenia.16  Kaczynski’s lawyers used what are now considered 
standard capital mitigation strategies—extensive in-person interviews 
with anyone associated with the defendant throughout his lifetime, a 
multi-generational investigation of potential mental illnesses, the 
development of extensive expert and lay testimonial and 
documentary evidence, and the creation of a compelling anti-death 
narrative—to secure a plea agreement that would spare his life.17  
From a sentencing standpoint, the defense of the Unabomber was an 
incredible success.18 
Compare Kaczynski’s case with that of Bernie Madoff, another high 
profile federal defendant who also captured the attention of the 
American public.  Like Kaczynski, Madoff was well-educated, at the 
top of his chosen profession, and had he taken a different path, he 
could have lived a life of considerable comfort.19  Instead, Madoff 
committed the “largest, longest, and most widespread Ponzi scheme 
in history,”20 which lasted an astounding twenty-two years and cost 
investors upwards of $65 billion.21  Madoff used his considerable 
abilities to attract billions of dollars to support fictitious hedge fund 
                                                            
 16. See Finnegan, supra note 12, at 54 (noting that no one doubted Kaczynski was 
legally sane, but his lawyers thought by presenting his psychiatric classification they 
could significantly mitigate his culpability). 
 17. See id. (describing how Kaczynski’s lawyers met with mental health experts 
and also with family historians to develop mitigation evidence); Joseph Goldstein 
& Marc Lacey, To Defend the Accused in a Tucson Rampage, First a Battle To Get Inside a 
Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/us/1 
3tucson.html (elaborating that Judy Clarke, Kaczynski’s lead attorney, does not 
focus on her clients’ innocence, but rather on how to save their lives by showing the 
jury a “mitigating social history” of her clients, including history of abuse or mental 
illness that the client may have suffered). 
 18. See Beau Friedlander, The Legendary Lawyer Who Will Defend Loughner:  Judy 
Clarke, TIME (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,2041943,00.html (discussing the extraordinary abilities of Clarke, who 
currently represents Jared Loughner, the shooter of Arizona Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords).  But see Finnegan, supra note 12, at 61 (suggesting Kaczynski’s 
attorneys did him a disservice by forcing the narrative of mental illness when he 
rejected that line of defense). 
 19. See, e.g., Les Christie, Peek Inside Madoff’s Homes and Boats, CNN.COM, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/09/real_estate/madoff_homes_boats/index.htm 
(last updated Sept. 10, 2009, 4:24 PM) (detailing Madoff’s many multimillion dollar 
homes and yachts). 
 20. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/ 
30madoff.html?pagewanted=print. 
 21. See Steve Fishman, The Madoff Tapes, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 27, 2011), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/berniemadoff-2011-3/. 
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returns, used the money to live a lavish lifestyle, and then repeatedly 
lied as investigators began uncovering the fraud.22  Madoff, like 
Kaczynski, was ultimately labeled a sociopath23 and is reviled by 
millions.24  Also like Kaczynski, Madoff will die in federal prison.  The 
seventy-one-year-old Madoff was sentenced to 150 years—ten times 
what would have been necessary to ensure he never left prison.25  The 
judge called his crimes “extraordinarily evil.”26 
Where Madoff’s case differs from Kaczynski’s is in how Madoff 
approached his sentencing.  In contrast to Kaczynski’s attorneys’ 
hundreds of hours of work and tireless efforts, Madoff’s attorneys did 
almost nothing at sentencing to mitigate their client’s criminal 
conduct.  They presented no evidence of any mental condition that 
might lessen Madoff’s culpability, even though there was ample 
indication of his extreme narcissism and lack of impulse control, 
common diagnoses of white collar defendants.27  Nor did they present 
any evidence of his extensive good works prior to committing his 
                                                            
 22. See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS 374–75, 420–21 (2011) (documenting 
the lavish lifestyle Madoff led and providing examples of his “flagrant lies,” such as 
Madoff’s claim that he only had about twenty investors when in reality he had 
thousands). 
 23. See Mona Ackerman, The Psychology Behind Bernie Madoff, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 18, 2008, 08:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mona-ackerman/the-
psychology-behind-ber_b_151966.html?view=print (agreeing that Madoff had, at the 
least, “sociopathic tendencies that bloomed in the proper environment”). 
 24. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 18–21, United States v. Madoff, No. 
09 CR 213 (S.D.N.Y June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Madoff Transcript] (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 25. Id. at 49. 
 26. Id. at 47.  Professor Craig Haney has identified this type of description as part 
of the “crime master narrative” that capital mitigation evidence is meant to combat.  
Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency:  Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital 
Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 841 (2008). 
 27. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 435 (suggesting Madoff’s pattern of lies 
indicates a sociopathic personality (citing MARTHA STOUT, THE SOCIOPATH NEXT 
DOOR 6–7 (2005))); Marilyn Price & Donna M. Norris, White-Collar Crime:  Corporate 
and Securities and Commodities Fraud, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 538, 542 (2009) 
(identifying personality characteristics of white collar criminals, which include 
exhibiting “narcissistic tendencies,” the “fear [of] losing their status and position,” 
and the lack of a “social conscience”); Fishman, supra note 21 (Madoff’s son 
described him as a “bully and a gifted manipulator” and identified his extreme 
narcissism).  Recent statements by Madoff support such diagnoses.  In letters Madoff 
wrote from prison, he described himself as “quite the celebrity” and said he was 
“treated like a Mafia don.”  Joseph Rhee and Shana Druckerman, ‘Like a Mafia Don’:  
Bernie Madoff’s Boastful Letter to Angry Daughter-in-Law, ABC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/mafia-don-bernie-madoffs-boastful-letter-angry-
daughter/story?id=14777562.  He also stated that the prison was “filled with ‘loads of 
friends’ who respected him.”  Id.  However, he did admit being relieved because he 
was “no longer in control.”  Chris Michaud, Madoff Says He Is Happier in Prison than 
Free, FOX BUS. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2011/10/27 
/madoff-says-is-happier-in-prison-than-free. 
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fraud.28  In fact, Madoff’s attorneys presented no narrative whatsoever 
to offset what even they called the “heart-wrenching stories of loss 
and deprivation” suffered by his victims.29  Madoff’s attorneys even 
failed to offer letters of support from family and friends, a basic 
mitigation technique used in most white collar cases.30  His attorneys 
offered only a dry statistical breakdown of federal sentencing data to 
argue for a non-disparate sentence31 and a plea allocution that 
explained the operation of his crime without explaining why he 
deserved leniency.32  In the end, Madoff turned to the courtroom 
gallery and offered only, “I am sorry.  I know that doesn’t help you.”33  
The judge sentenced Madoff to the maximum sought by the 
government—100 years more than recommended by the probation 
                                                            
 28. See Fishman, supra note 21 (quoting Madoff as asking, “[d]oes anybody want 
to hear that I had a successful business and did all these wonderful things for the 
industry?”).  By all accounts, Madoff was a well-regarded financier who gave millions 
to charities even before his Ponzi scheme began in the 1990s.  See Charity Caught Up 
in Wall Street Ponzi Scandal, FOX NEWS (Dec. 13. 2008), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,466665,00.html (recognizing that in 1998, 
the Madoff family established its charity, the Madoff Family Foundation, and for 
many years gave multi-million dollar donations to many New York charities). 
 29. Letter from Ira Lee Sorkin to Hon. Denny Chin (June 22, 2009) (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 30. Judge Denny Chin specifically mentioned the lack of supporting letters 
during Madoff’s sentencing hearing, stating that “[t]he absence of such support is 
telling.”  Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 46.  Compare Benjamin Weiser, Judge 
Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-his-
thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the judge 
received 450 emails and letters from victims of Madoff hoping to see him punished), 
with Ron Kampeas, Sharansky, 173 Others Plead Leniency for Libby, JWEEKLY.COM (June 8, 
2007), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/32649/sharansky-173-others-plead-
leniency-for-libby/ (summarizing the case of Scooter Libby, convicted of obstructing 
the investigation into the leaked name of covert CIA operative Valerie Plame, who 
submitted 174 letters appealing for leniency when facing just a thirty-seven-month 
sentence). 
 31. Of course, this argument was not compelling given there had never been a 
Ponzi scheme of this magnitude. 
 32. See Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 31–38 (noting that no letters were 
submitted attesting to Madoff’s good character or providing insight into his 
motivations). 
 33. Id. at 38.  Judge Chin has remarked that he did not believe Madoff was 
genuinely remorseful.  Weiser, supra note 30.  It should be obvious that Madoff’s case 
is not exactly typical.  Most white collar cases are not so extreme—the frauds are 
smaller, the public outcry is less, some mitigating arguments are made at sentencing, 
and the punishment is not so severe.  The sharp relief Madoff’s case offers from the 
typical, however, is precisely why it is a compelling example from which to draw.  
That Madoff’s attorneys used so few mitigation strategies and their client was 
sentenced so drastically demonstrates the dangers in ignoring the lessons of 
mitigation experts. 
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department—noting that sentencing a seventy-one-year-old to 150 
years was “largely, if not entirely, symbolic.”34 
So what can be learned from comparing the Madoff and Kaczynski 
cases—in which a first-time white collar offender charged with a 
nonviolent financial crime (albeit a massive one) receives a sentence 
functionally equivalent to that of a serial killer who terrorized the 
nation for twenty years?  Is there a lesson for the CEO from the case 
of the condemned? 
This Article contends that white collar defendants and their 
counsel can learn much by understanding how capital defense 
attorneys approach sentencing mitigation.  Federal white collar 
defense attorneys have failed to learn—indeed, have ignored—the 
lessons of sentencing mitigation employed so effectively by capital 
litigators and their teams of mitigation experts.  Most white collar 
defense attorneys approach sentencing as Madoff’s attorneys did, 
with little imagination and even less proven strategies to mitigate 
their client’s conduct.  This approach ignores the considerable 
mitigation arguments allowed under United States v. Booker35 and its 
progeny, and does a disservice to white collar defendants by exposing 
them to excessive sentences imposed in the name of “symbolism.”  
Effective sentencing advocacy demands that white collar defense 
attorneys “take a lesson from their comrades in the realm of capital 
litigation:  these attorneys have repeatedly demonstrated how to save 
clients’ lives through conducting a thorough investigation into the 
client’s social and psychological history and producing evidence that 
mitigates the crimes committed.”36 
While white collar sentencing will not change overnight, the goal 
of this Article is to highlight new strategies available in defending 
                                                            
 34. Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 47.  Judge Chin has recounted that he 
considered a twenty- to twenty-five-year sentence, but ultimately rejected it as “just 
way too low.”  Weiser, supra note 30.  He said sentencing Madoff to any additional 
years would be “purely symbolic,” yet he felt “symbolism was important . . . given the 
enormity of Mr. Madoff’s crimes.”  Id.  Judge Chin determined that sentencing 
Madoff to anything less than 150 years would be perceived as showing mercy, and 
“[f]rankly, that was not the message [he] wanted to be sent.”  Id.  Ultimately, Judge 
Chin said he feels “comfortable with the decision [he] reached.”  Hon. Denny Chin, 
Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium:  Sentencing Law:  
Rhetoric & Reality (Nov. 4, 2011) (notes on file with author); see also Denny Chin, 
Sentencing:  A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1574–75 (2012) (providing 
further insight into Judge Chin’s reasoning behind imposing such a lengthy 
sentence). 
 35. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that provisions of the then-mandatory United 
States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and excising those 
provisions to create an advisory sentencing guidelines regime). 
 36. Alan Ellis et al., Litigating in a Post-Booker World, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2005, at 
24, 31 [hereinafter Ellis et al., Litigating]. 
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white collar clients based on proven capital mitigation techniques.  
Part I discusses the development of the mitigation function in capital 
cases.  Part II discusses the parallel arc of federal sentencing 
jurisprudence, focusing particularly on the state of white collar 
sentencing post-Booker.  Finally, Part III presents seven key mitigation 
strategies currently used by capital mitigation experts and discusses 
how these strategies might be effectively employed in federal white 
collar cases. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MITIGATION FUNCTION IN CAPITAL 
CASES 
Understanding how federal white collar defendants and attorneys 
can learn from their capital defense counterparts begins with 
understanding capital mitigation.  It should come as no surprise that 
most attorneys, even experienced defense attorneys, have no concept 
of how mitigation evidence is developed and used in capital cases.  
Why would they?  Aside from a small cadre of nationally-recognized 
capital defense experts, a criminal defense attorney will probably 
never try a capital case and never put on mitigation evidence.37  That 
is especially true for white collar defense counsel.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to first provide an overview of the development of the 
mitigation function in capital cases in order to dispel the “mystery of 
mitigation.”38 
A. The Legal Framework of Capital Mitigation 
Capital mitigation as we know it today, loosely defined as “the 
empathy-evoking evidence that attempts to humanize the accused 
killer in death penalty cases,”39 begins with the modern era of the 
death penalty.  In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Furman v. 
Georgia,40 addressing whether states’ discretionary death penalty 
                                                            
 37. See Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It:  Supplementary Guidelines for the 
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 713 
(2008) [hereinafter O’Brien, When Life Depends on It] (stating that mitigation is 
probably the least understood concept in capital sentencing); Russell Stetler, The 
Mystery of Mitigation:  What Jurors Need To Make a Reasoned Moral Response in Capital 
Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. SOC. CHANGE 237, 237 (2008) [hereinafter Stetler, Mystery of 
Mitigation] (“Indeed, in twenty years of federal death penalty prosecutions, very few 
judges have presided over more than one penalty proceeding.  Some of the most 
experienced public defenders specializing in capital cases have presented mitigating 
evidence only a handful of times over their long careers.”). 
 38. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 237 (explaining that capital 
mitigation is the process by which an attorney attempts to humanize an accused 
killer). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
HAUGH.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:54 PM 
10 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
statutes, which gave juries the decision to impose death sentences, 
were constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.41  
In a 5-4 decision, with all the Justices writing separately, the Court 
held that all capital statutes then in place violated the Constitution.42  
The consensus of the fractured opinion was that juries could not 
constitutionally be given unfettered discretion, which was often 
exercised arbitrarily, to determine which defendants were sentenced 
to death.43  The dramatic effect of Furman was to halt the execution of 
every person on death row at the time.44 
In response, state legislatures drafted new death penalty statutes, 
beginning a thirty-year “work-in-progress.”45  Many of these statutes 
gave capital juries “guided discretion,” meaning they instructed jury 
members to consider specific aggravating and mitigating factors 
during sentencing, as a way to comply with Furman.46  In Gregg v. 
Georgia,47 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s guided 
discretion statute, thereby reinstating the death penalty in a portion 
of states.48  Justice Stewart, writing the plurality opinion, held that 
Georgia’s statute, which directed the jury’s attention to “the specific 
circumstances of the crime,”49 did not violate the Eighth Amendment 
because it gave the jury “clear and objective standards” to consider.50 
Although the opinion hinted at the importance of mitigation 
evidence, the Court gave little guidance as to what the mitigation 
                                                            
 41. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law:  Mitigating Factors and the 
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 651–52 
(2004) (mandatory death penalty statutes had been phased out in large part by 
1963).  The Supreme Court had earlier held that discretionary death penalty statutes 
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but had not addressed whether they 
violated the Eighth Amendment.  See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185 
(1971) (stating that an accused’s rights were not violated by the imposition of a 
death sentence), vacated, Crampton v. Ohio, 92 S. Ct. 2873 (1972). 
 42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. 
 43. See id. at 239–40, 256–57 (noting that the statute at issue, which imposed the 
death penalty on defendants convicted of murder and rape, leads to discrimination 
by jurors that is “not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is 
implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments”); Kirchmeier, supra note 41, 
at 652 (explaining that the arbitrary imposition of death was of great concern for the 
majority of the Justices). 
 44. See Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 652 (explaining that some state legislatures 
reverted back to mandatory death sentencing statutes in the wake of Furman, while 
others sought to limit the sentencer’s discretion through guided discretion statutes). 
 45. Haney, supra note 26, at 845. 
 46. Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 653. 
 47. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 48. Haney, supra note 26, at 845; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) 
(upholding a guided discretion death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242 (1976) (same). 
 49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197–98 (plurality opinion). 
 50. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)). 
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function encompassed.  Professor Craig Haney has explained that 
Gregg merely adopted the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) listing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed without any 
practical or theoretical elaboration: 
Justice Stewart . . . noted, with a degree of understatement, that the 
standards to be considered by a jury in determining whether to 
impose a death sentence “are by necessity somewhat general.”  
There was no explanation or discussion—in the MPC or by the 
Court—about exactly what the concept of aggravation or 
mitigation meant, why they were important to include in a 
constitutional scheme of death penalty decision-making, or 
precisely how capital jurors were supposed to use them in choosing 
between life and death.51 
Gregg did, however, specifically approve of the jury’s consideration 
of the “circumstances of the crime and the criminal,” mentioning that 
“special facts about th[e] defendant that [might] mitigate against 
imposing capital punishment” included the defendant’s youth, his 
cooperation with the police, and his emotional state during the 
commission of the crime.52  Albeit vaguely, Gregg had planted the first 
seeds concerning the use of mitigation evidence in capital cases. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina53 and Roberts v. Louisiana,54 the concept 
of mitigation in capital cases began to grow.  In Woodson, Justice 
Stewart, again writing for a plurality, struck down a mandatory death 
penalty statute, stating that the Eighth Amendment “requires 
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”55  
The mandatory statute in Roberts, although more narrowly drafted, 
was struck down for the same reasons.56  Neither case, however, 
specified what individual offender characteristics should be 
considered, or why and how the “diverse frailties of humankind” 
alluded to in the Woodson opinion might be employed as mitigating 
evidence.57 
                                                            
 51. Haney, supra note 26, at 845–46 (footnote omitted). 
 52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
 53. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 54. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 55. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
 56. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335–36 (stating that “Louisiana’s mandatory death 
sentence law employs a procedure that was rejected by that State’s legislature 130 
years ago and that subsequently has been renounced by legislatures and juries in 
every jurisdiction in this Nation” (footnote omitted)). 
 57. Haney, supra note 26, at 846 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). 
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Yet within two years, the concept of mitigation had firmly taken 
hold in death penalty jurisprudence.  In Lockett v. Ohio,58 the Court 
invalidated Ohio’s death penalty statute, which “narrowly limit[ed] 
the sentencer’s discretion to consider the circumstances of the crime 
and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors.”59  
In what became known as the Lockett doctrine, Chief Justice Burger 
significantly broadened the scope of potential mitigation evidence 
available at trial.60  After recognizing the long history of 
individualized sentencing in the United States, the Court held there 
could be almost no limits on mitigating evidence offered by a 
defendant in a capital case.61  “[T]he sentencer . . . [can]not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”62  The Court struck down the Ohio statute because it limited 
mitigation to questions of whether the defendant had facilitated the 
offense, whether it was unlikely that the defendant would have 
committed the crime but for some strong provocation, and whether 
the offense was primarily the product of a mental deficiency.63  
Although the Lockett doctrine was a significant advance in death 
penalty jurisprudence because it ensured that capital sentencers 
would be in “‘possession of the fullest information possible 
concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,’”64 the decision 
still did not explain what actually constituted mitigation evidence or 
how it could be effectively used. 
While Lockett had certainly “made up in breadth what [the Court’s 
explanation of capital mitigation] lacked in clarity,” the decision’s 
failure to specify what comprised mitigation evidence or its 
boundaries was problematic.65  “In essence, Lockett told trial courts to 
allow evidence to be admitted that . . . might serve as the basis of a 
sentence less than death.  But it did not suggest how or why [the 
                                                            
 58. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 59. Id. at 589. 
 60. See Haney, supra note 26, at 846–47 (noting that besides elaborating on the 
great breadth of information the jury was to possess, the Court failed to provide 
substantive guidelines for mitigation). 
 61. See id. at 847. 
 62. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis omitted and added). 
 63. See id. at 593–94 (summarizing how the trial judge determined he had no 
alternative but to impose a death sentence under the statute). 
 64. Id. at 603 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). 
 65. Haney, supra note 26, at 846 (elaborating that Justice Stewart’s opinion “did 
not specify which diverse frailties he had in mind, or why and how he believed those 
frailties might generate compassion or constitute mitigation”). 
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sentencer] could or should actually be inclined by the evidence to 
lean . . . .”66  This lack of clarity caused “unevenness” in how capital 
defense attorneys approached the use of mitigation.67  Some did 
nothing, arguing the same way and with the same evidence as they 
had during pre-Lockett cases.68  Others, however, thought “expansively 
and creatively” about the issue of mitigation and began exploring 
every tool available to mitigate their client’s conduct, including 
developing arguments based on advancements in psychology, 
psychiatry, and physiology.69  Lockett, therefore, invigorated the 
imaginations of at least some dedicated capital litigators. 
In a series of decisions after Lockett, the Court began to flesh out 
the parameters of mitigation.  In Skipper v. South Carolina,70 the Court 
struck down a statute that excluded mitigation evidence detailing the 
defendant’s behavior after the offense, such as the defendant’s 
adjustment to prison.71  In Eddings v. Oklahoma,72 the Court held that 
mitigation evidence related to the defendant’s violent upbringing 
also could not be excluded at trial.73  The Court furthered this line of 
reasoning in California v. Brown,74 stating that evidence of the 
defendant’s background was particularly relevant in death penalty 
cases.75  And in Penry v. Lynaugh,76 the Court held that a capital jury 
must be given instructions allowing it to consider mitigating evidence 
of the defendant’s mental retardation and childhood abuse.77  The 
                                                            
 66. Id. at 847. 
 67. See id. at 848 (stating that many attorneys simply did not know what would 
now constitute mitigating evidence). 
 68. See id. (explaining that many defense attorneys could not figure out which 
parts of a defendant’s past could be mitigating to a juror, while others did not 
present mitigation evidence at all). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 476 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 71. See id. at 5 (“Consideration of a defendant’s past conduct as indicative of his 
probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal 
sentencing:  ‘any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable 
future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to 
impose.’” (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976))). 
 72. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 73. See id. at 116 (“[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.”). 
 74. 479 U.S. 538 (1987). 
 75. See id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[E]vidence about the defendant’s 
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, 
that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged 
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than 
defendants who have no such excuse.”). 
 76. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 77. See id. at 322, 340 (concluding that evidence of mental retardation and 
childhood abuse is relevant in determining moral culpability and should be 
considered when imposing sentences). 
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Penry decision solidified the validity and scope of mitigation—the 
Court now widely recognized a capital defendant’s Eighth 
Amendment right to present evidence of any mitigating factor that 
would allow the jury a “‘reasoned moral response to the defendant’s 
background, character, and crime.’”78 
The next important development in capital mitigation came ten 
years later in Williams v. Taylor.79  Although it was clear that mitigation 
evidence could not be excluded from a capital sentencer’s penalty 
determination, it was less clear whether the law required that evidence 
be presented on a capital defendant’s behalf.80  Williams answered the 
question affirmatively, finding that capital counsel violated a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
by failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence.81  In 
Williams, the Court admonished defense counsel’s failure to seek 
records that would have demonstrated the defendant’s brutal 
upbringing, nonviolent nature, borderline mental retardation, and 
positive rehabilitation.82  Williams established that not only were 
                                                            
 78. Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 
184 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 79. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 80. See id. at 370–74 (recounting the lower courts’ conflicting application of the 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which 
determined whether counsel’s failure to submit mitigating evidence violated the 
Sixth Amendment). 
 81. See id. at 398–99 (holding that counsel’s failure to unearth his client’s social 
history records to use as mitigating evidence violated the Constitution). 
 82. In a chilling passage, Justice Stevens described the type of mitigating 
evidence the defendant’s attorneys should have found if they had conducted a 
thorough investigation: 
The record establishes that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the 
sentencing] phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial.  They 
failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive 
records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood . . . .  Had 
they done so, the jury would have learned that Williams’ parents had been 
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that 
Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had 
been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years 
during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster 
home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been 
returned to his parents’ custody. 
  Counsel failed to introduce available evidence that Williams was 
“borderline mentally retarded” and did not advance beyond sixth grade in 
school.  They failed to seek prison records recording Williams’ 
commendations for helping to crack a prison drug ring and for returning a 
guard’s missing wallet, or the testimony of prison officials who described 
Williams as among the inmates “least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or 
provocative way.”  Counsel failed even to return the phone call of a certified 
public accountant who had offered to testify that he had visited Williams 
frequently when Williams was incarcerated as part of a prison ministry 
program, that Williams “seemed to thrive in a more regimented and 
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capital defense attorneys required to present any available mitigation 
evidence, they were required to conduct a thorough investigation 
into a defendant’s background and social history to uncover evidence 
that may prove effective in mitigating a client’s sentence.83 
Two subsequent cases further clarified both the “[c]ritical role”84 
of mitigating background evidence and the necessary scope of 
defense counsel’s investigation.  In Wiggins v. Smith,85 the Court found 
capital counsel ineffective when they made a “strategic” decision to 
discontinue an investigation into the defendant’s personal 
background, despite evidence of the defendant’s extreme abuse.86  
The Court faulted the attorneys’ half-hearted investigatory approach, 
asserting that counsel “acquired only rudimentary knowledge of 
[their client’s] history from a narrow set of sources” and ignored 
their client’s “medical history, educational history, employment and 
training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile 
correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.”87  
Wiggins “acknowledged—in a clear and definitive way—the 
importance of developing and, when appropriate, presenting a 
mitigating social history.”88  Rompilla v. Beard89 furthered the holding 
in Wiggins, finding defense counsel ineffective for failing to fully 
investigate a defendant’s social history, even when the defendant 
insisted his background was unexceptional and tried to obstruct his 
attorneys’ investigative efforts.90 
                                                            
structured environment,” and that Williams was proud of the carpentry 
degree he earned while in prison. 
Id. at 395–96. 
 83. Id. at 393. 
 84. Haney, supra note 26, at 851. 
 85. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 86. Id. at 516–17, 526. 
 87. Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 88. Haney, supra note 26, at 851. 
 89. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 90. See id. at 391.  If counsel would have investigated further, they would have 
found: 
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Rompilla thus capped the Court’s thirty-year “work-in-progress” 
surrounding capital mitigation.91  In three decades, “the Court had 
moved from merely mentioning mitigation (without defining the 
term or even commenting that none had been presented in the cases 
it was deciding) to reversing a death sentence on the basis of 
counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate background and social 
history investigation.”92  The constitutional requirements of 
presenting mitigation evidence were established, but it remained to 
be seen how capital litigators would implement the mitigation 
function in practice. 
B. The ABA Guidelines and the Institutionalized Role of Capital Mitigation 
Soon after the Court’s pronouncement in Williams that capital 
defense counsel were required to investigate and present mitigation 
evidence, the American Bar Association (ABA) began updating its 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”).93  While the 
previous version of the ABA Guidelines provided that investigations 
into mitigating evidence “should comprise efforts to discover all 
                                                            
Rompilla’s parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly.  His 
mother drank during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers 
eventually developed serious drinking problems.  His father, who had a 
vicious temper, frequently beat Rompilla’s mother, leaving her bruised and 
black-eyed, and bragged about his cheating on her.  His parents fought 
violently, and on at least one occasion his mother stabbed his father.  He was 
abused by his father who beat him when he was young with his hands, fists, 
leather straps, belts and sticks.  All of the children lived in terror.  There 
were no expressions of parental love, affection or approval.  Instead, he was 
subjected to yelling and verbal abuse.  His father locked Rompilla and his 
brother Richard in a small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement 
filled.  He had an isolated background, and was not allowed to visit other 
children or to speak to anyone on the phone.  They had no indoor 
plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children 
were not given clothes and attended school in rags. 
Id. at 391–92 (citations omitted). 
 91. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to individualized sentencing in the 
most recent Term.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) 
(“[I]ndividualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have 
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest 
possible penalties [life without the possibility of parole] for juveniles.”).  However, it 
remains to be seen whether the decision will lead to an expansion of protection for 
non-juvenile offenders facing sentences of life without parole. 
 92. Haney, supra note 26, at 855.  However, capital counsel’s strategic decision to 
not introduce mitigation evidence is not ineffective assistance so long as counsel 
demonstrates that he completed an adequate investigation.  See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. 
Ct. 841, 850 (2010) (finding that the decision not to pursue or present possible 
mitigating evidence does not qualify as ineffective counsel if the record shows that 
the decision was deliberate and strategic). 
 93. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003). 
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reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any 
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor,”94 
the revisions specifically addressed the newly-established investigation 
requirement.95  The revised ABA Guidelines were also a direct 
response to cases in which defense counsel, despite the Williams 
ruling, had failed to conduct a thorough and independent 
investigation of the defendant’s background and social history.96  The 
ABA determined that capital attorneys knew the importance of 
developing mitigation evidence, but they simply “did not know how 
to do it properly.”97 
The ABA Guidelines provided attorneys a template for building 
their client’s mitigation case.  First, capital attorneys were required to 
expand and restructure their defense teams.98  Defense teams were 
now obligated to consist of at least two attorneys, an investigator, and 
a mitigation specialist, with one team member qualified to identify 
mental or psychological disorders.99  This was no small change; many 
capital cases at the time were tried with a single defense attorney and 
an investigator.  Second, mitigation investigations were required to be 
conducted regardless of the defendant’s cooperation.100  Finally, the 
ABA Guidelines recognized that developing mitigation evidence 
“require[d] extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into 
personal and family history,” which included inquiry into the 
defendant’s medical, family, social, educational, military, 
employment, and correctional history from “the moment of 
conception.” 101  While the Supreme Court had generally outlined the 
necessary scope of social history investigations, the ABA Guidelines 
“codified” the specific areas in which a capital defense team, and 
                                                            
 94. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989) (emphasis added). 
 95. See Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 770 (2008) 
(addressing the frequent failure of defense counsel to investigate and present 
mitigation evidence by suggesting that capital defendants retain the assistance of a 
mitigation specialist). 
 96. Id. at 768; see, e.g., Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(faulting counsel for the minimal investigation into the petitioner’s mental health 
and social history); Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(criticizing defense counsel’s performance at trial in failing to present any mitigating 
evidence of defendant’s past and therefore calling into doubt the jury’s decision to 
sentence the defendant to death). 
 97. Maher, supra note 95, at 769. 
 98. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES guideline 4.1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. guideline 10.7. 
 101. Id. guideline 10.7 cmt. 
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particularly a mitigation specialist, must investigate.102  The ABA 
Guidelines represented a significant advancement in the attempt to 
achieve individualized and constitutionally valid capital sentencing, 
thereby becoming the national standard as courts adopted and 
enforced their provisions.103 
In 2008, the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of 
Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (“Supplementary Guidelines”) were 
issued to further develop the mitigation function in capital cases.104  
The Supplementary Guidelines not only confirmed the indispensable 
role of the mitigation specialist on the capital defense team, they also 
identified and institutionalized those specialists’ best practices.105  For 
example, the Supplementary Guidelines provided a more detailed list of 
the areas of mitigation a specialist was required to investigate: 
Mitigation evidence includes, but is not limited to, compassionate 
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind, the 
ability to make a positive adjustment to incarceration, the realities 
of incarceration and the actual meaning of a life sentence, capacity 
for redemption, remorse, execution impact, vulnerabilities related 
to mental health, explanations of patterns of behavior, negation of 
aggravating evidence regardless of its designation as an aggravating 
factor, positive acts or qualities, responsible conduct in other areas 
of life (e.g. employment, education, military service, as a family 
member), any evidence bearing on the degree of moral culpability, 
and any other reason for a sentence less than death.106 
The Supplementary Guidelines also outlined the necessary skills a 
mitigation specialist must possess.  Specialists could come from any 
background, so long as they were “skilled interviewers who [could] 
recognize and elicit information about mental health signs and 
symptoms,” had the ability to “establish rapport with witnesses, the 
client, the client’s family and significant others,” and were able to 
“advise counsel on appropriate mental health and other expert 
                                                            
 102. Id. guideline 4.1. 
 103. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 246–47 (referring to the 
revised ABA Guidelines as “national standards of practice” that “have guided 
numerous courts in rejecting proffered excuses for failing to investigate mitigation”); 
see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (calling the 1989 ABA Guidelines 
“well-defined norms”). 
 104. Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death 
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines].  
Although the Supplementary Guidelines were developed in cooperation with the ABA’s 
Death Penalty Representation Project, they were not an official publication of the 
ABA.  For a an account of how the Supplementary Guidelines came into being, see 
O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 694–702. 
 105. Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 679. 
 106. Id. at 679. 
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assistance.”107  In addition, the Supplementary Guidelines required that 
the defense team’s mitigation specialist conduct an exhaustive and 
detailed investigation into the defendant’s life history, delving into 
every possible influence that may have impacted the defendant since 
birth.108 
Finally, the Supplementary Guidelines explained that a mitigation 
investigation must include multiple “in-person, face-to-face, one-on-
one interviews” by the mitigation specialist, which should be 
supported with both documentary evidence (e.g., genealogies, social 
history reports, chronologies) and expert and lay testimony from a 
variety of witnesses.109  Taken together, these directives confirmed 
that the mitigation function is of “utmost importance in the defense 
of capital cases,” and that the mitigation specialist—with all the 
expertise that person brings to a case—is essential to the effective 
representation of capital defendants.110 
Capital mitigation is no longer a mystery—at least to those paying 
attention.  What started as a vague mention in a single death penalty 
case111 has developed into a series of specific, institutionalized 
mandates that require an exceptionally high standard of legal 
representation.112  These mandates, developed and perfected over the 
last thirty-plus years, compel a broad investigation into every aspect of 
a capital defendant’s background and social history—and not just by 
a single lawyer, but by a team of experts knowledgeable in the legal 
complexities of the guilt and penalty phases of capital trials, who are 
also able to construct a detailed social history of the defendant from a 
variety of sources.113 
When the mitigation function operates as intended, it works.  “Life 
verdicts in cases involving horrendous loss of life,” as well as “[m]ore 
mundane examples occur[ring] week after week in courtrooms 
                                                            
 107. Id. at 682; see also Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 248–50 
(recounting how mitigation investigation requires a distinct skill-set typically 
unlearned in the legal profession). 
 108.  See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 682 (life history can range 
from a defendant’s medical, mental health, or substance abuse history, to evidence 
of past trauma, educational problems, military experience, and community 
influences). 
 109. See id. at 689–92 (“It is the duty of the defense team to aid counsel in 
coordinating and integrating the case for life with the guilt or iunocence [sic] phase 
strategy . . . .  Multiple interviews will be necessary to establish trust, elicit sensitive 
information and conduct a thorough and reliable life-history investigation.”). 
 110. Id. at 677. 
 111. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(requiring the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the crime and the 
characteristics of the alleged criminal before recommending a sentence). 
 112. See supra notes 53–110 and accompanying text. 
 113. Id. 
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across the country,” demonstrate that death sentences are “never 
automatic or inevitable.” 114  That is true because when skilled and 
motivated capital defense teams use proven mitigation strategies, the 
evidence they develop and present has a remarkable “transformative” 
power to impact a defendant’s sentence.115  This power is what 
rendered the Unabomber’s seemingly hopeless death penalty case 
into one in which Ted Kaczynski will serve a life sentence.  The 
question remains, however, whether that power may be successfully 
harnessed outside the death penalty context.  While mitigation may 
no longer be a mystery, can defendants like Madoff use it effectively 
in federal white collar cases? 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The answer to that question is yes.  But to fully understand how the 
development of mitigation strategies for death penalty defendants 
could benefit white collar defendants, it is necessary to review the 
current state of federal white collar sentencing.  As will be seen, the 
evolution of white collar sentencing follows a parallel arc with the 
development of capital mitigation.  Recent changes in federal 
sentencing law, similar to those occurring in the capital context a 
generation prior, have completely remade the white collar sentencing 
landscape.  These changes, particularly the increase in judicial 
sentencing discretion post-Booker, provide white collar counsel new 
opportunities to use the tools of capital mitigation to more effectively 
advocate for their clients at sentencing. 
A. The Changing Role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Much like with Furman in the death penalty context, the current 
state of federal white collar sentencing was created by an 
“earthquake” Supreme Court decision, the effects of which are still 
                                                            
 114. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 238 (listing high-profile death 
penalty defendants, such as Lee Boyd Malvo, Zacarias Moussaoui, and Terry Nichols, 
who all received life sentences, as well as Jeremy Gross, who was given a life sentence 
despite that the murder he committed in a liquor store was recorded in its entirety). 
 115. Id.; see also Sarah Elizabeth Richards, How To Humanize a Killer, SALON (June 7, 
2006, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2006/06/07/mitigation_specialists 
(validating the effectiveness of presenting mitigation evidence in court).  Of course, 
not all capital defendants have access to dedicated and skilled attorneys.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. Hobbs, 131 S. Ct. 558 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (criticizing a capital defense attorney who called only one witness at the 
penalty phase who did not personally know the defendant, and then failed to 
introduce evidence of the defendant’s negligent upbringing, which involved extreme 
sexual and physical abuse). 
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being felt today.116  In the two decades leading up to 2005, federal 
sentences were determined almost exclusively by the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).117  Promulgated under the 
authority of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,118 the Guidelines had 
the goal of creating honesty in sentencing and reducing unwarranted 
sentencing disparities prevalent in the indeterminate, parole-based 
scheme operating at the time.119  The Guidelines replaced the 
indeterminate system with one in which judicial sentencing discretion 
was significantly reduced by establishing narrow sentencing ranges 
based on a series of factors, including the type of offense, 
characteristics of the victim and offender, and the defendant’s 
criminal history.120 
From their inception, the Guidelines were a lightning rod for 
criticism.  One of the primary arguments against the Guidelines was 
that they were too rigid.121  Part of that rigidity came from the 
Guidelines’ sharp limitations of the arguments available to 
defendants at sentencing.122  Dozens of Guidelines provisions directed 
judges to consider a range of aggravating factors, but at the same 
time directed them to disregard many mitigating factors, including 
education level, family history, socioeconomic status, and drug 
                                                            
 116. Douglas A. Berman, Foreword:  Beyond Blakely and Booker:  Pondering Modern 
Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 670 (2005). 
 117. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres?  The Curious 
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 380–82 
(2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Curious History] (providing an overview of the 
Guidelines and an explanation of how they operate to calculate a defendant’s 
sentence). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 & 28 U.S.C.). 
 119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1.3 (2011) 
(identifying Congress’s three objectives in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act); see 
also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:  Finding and 
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20 
(2003) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was intended to eliminate 
unwarranted sentencing disparity . . . .”).  See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 38–77 (1998) 
(offering a comprehensive history of federal sentencing). 
 120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1; see also Stephen Breyer, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1988) (providing an overview of how the Guidelines work and the 
basic principles underlying their implementation). 
 121. See J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles:  A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth 
Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 723–28 (2011) 
[hereinafter Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles] (highlighting the friction between 
Congress and federal judges forced to adhere to the Guidelines). 
 122. See id. at 726 (“The rigidity of the Guidelines can be traced to a zeal for 
parity. . . .  [T]he Guidelines imposed dramatic limits on judicial discretion.  Yet in 
doing so, the Guidelines deprived judges of the ability to tailor appropriate sentences 
to the characteristics of each offender and each offense.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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addiction.123  While departures outside the calculated sentencing 
range were contemplated, they were only allowed when the 
circumstances of a case were not adequately taken into consideration 
by the Guidelines, i.e., when the case was outside the “heartland” of 
typical cases.124  Departures were rarely granted, and when they did 
begin to increase Congress attempted to limit their use.125 
Another criticism of the Guidelines was that they were too harsh.126  
Particularly as to white collar offenders, the Guidelines operated as a 
one-way “upward ratchet,” continually driving sentencing ranges 
higher.127  Indeed, one of the compromises embodied in the 
Guidelines concerned increased penalties for white collar 
defendants.128  While the sentencing ranges for most crimes were 
determined first by analyzing pre-Guidelines sentences and then by 
establishing sentencing ranges based on past practices, the 
sentencing ranges for economic crimes were set higher than in the 
past based on policy decisions.129  The Sentencing Commission 
                                                            
 123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 1.4–1.6, 1.10–1.12 
(identifying specific offender characteristics not ordinarily relevant in sentencing); 
see also Breyer, supra note 120, at 19–20 (explaining that compromises by the 
Sentencing Commission resulted in leaving out mitigating personal characteristics of 
the defendant in favor of using criminal history to increase sentences). 
 124. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(4). 
 125. See Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles, supra note 121, at 712–13, 724 (“At 
one point, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay threatened, ‘The judges need to be 
intimidated . . . [t]hey need to uphold the Constitution.  If they don’t behave, we’re 
going to go after them in a big way.’  And in what sometimes seemed like a battle 
between branches of government, some legislators threatened to strip judges of all 
discretion, enacting broad slates of mandatory minimums.” (footnotes omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 126. See id. at 707–11 (evaluating the arguments opposing the Guidelines’ 
severity). 
 127. See James E. Felman, The Need To Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
High-Loss Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 138 (2010) (arguing that the 
Guidelines caused unnecessarily long sentences for white-collar defendants who 
typically lacked previous criminal records). 
 128. Breyer, supra note 120, at 20–21; Alan Ellis et al., At a “Loss” for Justice:  Federal 
Sentencing for Economic Offenses, 25 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (2011) [hereinafter Ellis et al., 
Loss for Justice]. 
 129.  See Bowman, Curious History, supra note 117, at 385 (detailing how the 
Sentencing Commission purposefully increased sentences for crimes against 
property over pre-Guidelines levels because the Commissioners “were plainly 
concerned that probationary sentences had been too common in economic crimes” 
and thus longer prison terms for white-collar offenders better served the Guidelines’ 
objectives); Felman, supra note 127, at 138 (“Unlike the penalties for most offenses, 
which the initial Sentencing Commission pegged to match pre-Guidelines practice, 
the commission specifically elected to increase the penalties for economic crimes in 
the initial 1987 Guidelines over the pre-Guidelines as a whole.”).  But see John R. 
Steer, The Sentencing Commission’s Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 
263, 263 (2003) (suggesting both a policy and empirical basis for the initial fraud 
guidelines). 
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believed that white collar offenders deserved higher penalties 
because they were receiving less severe treatment than other similar 
offenders.130 
In addition, between 1987 and 2001, sentencing ranges climbed 
from those initial elevated levels as the “loss table,” the main 
determiner of offense level for white collar crimes, was repeatedly 
adjusted upward.131  A series of aggravating specific offense 
characteristics was also added, which increased sentencing ranges 
even more.132  This trend continued into the early 2000s as Congress, 
through its Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, directed heightened penalties 
for economic crimes in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco 
corporate scandals.133  The result was a sentencing framework for 
white collar offenders that limited probation, increased average 
sentences, and exposed high-loss defendants to decades—and even a 
lifetime—of imprisonment.134 
                                                            
 130. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1.3 (2011) 
(noting that economic crimes were being treated more leniently than other 
equivalent behavior); Breyer, supra note 120, at 20 (“The Commission found in its 
data significant discrepancies between pre-Guideline punishment of certain white-
collar crimes, such as fraud, and other similar common law crimes, such as theft.”). 
 131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1); see also Bowman, Curious 
History, supra note 117, at 387–91 (offering a comprehensive history of the evolution 
and reform of the Guidelines); Ellis et al., Loss for Justice, supra note 128, at 36 
(evaluating the Commission’s continuous adjustments to the loss table).  The loss 
table increases offense level, which is one of two factors that determines the 
sentencing range (the other is criminal history), as the loss to the victim increases.  
The current table has fifteen, two-level increases, up to thirty offense levels for a loss 
of more than $400,000,000.  Each increase of six offense levels approximately 
doubles the sentence.  Felman, supra note 127, at 138. 
 132. See Bowman, Curious History, supra note 117, at 387 (noting that in the years 
following the 1989 updates to the Guidelines, the Commission “added an array of 
specific offense characteristics and passed numerous amendments”). 
 133. Compare id. at 431–35 (characterizing the Congressional motives of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation), with Frank O. Bowman, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate 
Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 168–69 (2008) [hereinafter 
Bowman, Sentencing] (indicating how the Guidelines resulted in CEOs receiving 
lengthy prison sentences in white collar cases). 
 134. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 168 (charting increases in a 
hypothetical corporate defendant’s sentence from 1987 to 2007).  Most recently, 
Congress has asked the Sentencing Commission to evaluate whether penalties for 
securities and mortgage fraud should be increased in response to the global financial 
collapse of 2008.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1079A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010) (directing the Sentencing 
Commission to “review and, if appropriate, amend the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of offenses relating 
to securities fraud or any other similar provision of law, in order to reflect the intent 
of Congress that penalties for the offenses under the guidelines and policy 
statements appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to the public and 
the financial markets from the offenses”).  The Act contains a similarly worded 
provision related to financial institution and mortgage fraud, requiring the 
Commission to “ensure appropriate terms of imprisonment for offenders involved in 
substantial bank frauds or other frauds relating to financial institutions.”  Id.  While 
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Then, in 2004, the entire landscape shifted.  In Blakely v. 
Washington,135 the Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth 
Amendment permitted a Washington sentencing judge to increase a 
defendant’s sentence above a prescribed sentencing range based on 
an aggravating factor found by the judge but not admitted by the 
defendant or proved to a jury.136  The State of Washington charged 
defendant Ralph Blakely with first-degree kidnapping and domestic 
violence after he threatened his wife and thirteen-year-old son with a 
shotgun.137  Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnapping, a 
lesser offense that subjected him to a maximum of fifty-three months’ 
imprisonment under Washington’s determinate guideline sentencing 
scheme.138  However, upon hearing the sordid details of the crime at 
sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Blakely had been “deliberately cruel[]” and imposed a ninety-month 
sentence.139  This “exceptional” sentence was thirty-seven months 
higher than the “standard maximum” under the guidelines, but was 
still within the statutory maximum for second-degree kidnapping.140 
Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-4 majority, found this increase 
beyond the presumptive guideline range unconstitutional because it 
deprived Blakely of his Sixth Amendment jury trial rights.141  The 
Blakely Court, extending the reach of its decision in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,142 held that any fact other than a prior conviction that raises the 
                                                            
the explicit text of the Act does not require the Commission to promulgate 
guidelines increasing penalties, it is unlikely that Congress intended for the 
Commission to lower sentences for white collar offenders after the largest financial 
collapse in U.S. history.  See id. 
 135. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 136. Id. at 298. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 298–99.  For an overview of how various sentencing schemes, including 
determinant schemes, may meet the goals of sentencing, see generally CASSIA C. 
SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? (2d ed. 2009). 
 139. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 305.  The Court in Blakely relied on a different aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment than it had in the Williams line of capital cases.  Compare id. at 300 
(relying on the right to trial by jury), with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 
(2000) (relying on the right to effective counsel). 
 142. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Apprendi is considered a “watershed” decision. 
[It] declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime enhancement that 
enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than the otherwise 
available statutory maximum for various crimes based on a finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an offense involved racial animus.  The 
Apprendi Court asserted the hate crime sentencing enhancement was 
constitutionally problematic because, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
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penalty “beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”143  The 
Court defined “statutory maximum” not as the overall statutory 
maximum based on the type of offense, but as the “maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 144  In other words, “the relevant 
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may 
impose without any additional findings” beyond what the jury found 
in its verdict or what was admitted by the defendant.145 
Despite the obvious implications for the federal sentencing 
scheme, which was strikingly similar to Washington’s scheme, the 
majority did not address Blakely’s application to the Guidelines.146  In 
separate dissents, however, four Justices warned that the majority’s 
opinion would mean an end to all determinate guidelines systems, 
hindering sentencing reforms aimed at increasing fairness and 
decreasing disparity.147  Observers believed Blakely meant the end of 
what had been known as the “sentencing revolution” —the move 
from indeterminate sentencing culminating in the passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act and the implementation of the Guidelines.148 
The observers were half right.  A year later, in United States v. 
Booker,149 the Court squarely addressed whether the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.150  In another 
5-4 decision, the Court, as predicted, found “no distinction of 
constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in [Blakely].”151  
The Court reiterated that other than the fact of prior conviction, any 
                                                            
Berman, supra note 116, at 672 (alteration in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
490). 
 143. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (supporting 
Apprendi’s “bright-line rule” based on the constitutional right to a jury-trial); 
Berman, supra note 116, at 672–73 (describing Apprendi as a “watershed” decision 
due to its categorization of judicial fact-finding as “constitutionally problematic”). 
 144. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
 145. Id. at 303–04. 
 146. See id. at 305 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express 
no opinion on them.”). 
 147. See id. at 323 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The consequences of today’s 
decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing.  Washington’s sentencing 
system is by no means unique.  Numerous other States have enacted guidelines 
systems, as has the Federal Government.  Today’s decision casts constitutional doubt 
over them all . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 148. Berman, supra note 116, at 654–59. 
 149. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 150. Id. at 226–27. 
 151. Id. at 233. 
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fact necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the facts established in a guilty plea or by jury verdict 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.152  Because the 
Guidelines were mandatory, thereby requiring judges to increase a 
defendant’s “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes” based on 
factual findings not submitted to a jury, they violated the Sixth 
Amendment.153 
The obvious remedy was to invalidate the Guidelines entirely, as 
the Court had done in Blakely; however, the Court took another path.  
In what was essentially a separate opinion, a different majority of 
Justices determined that the constitutional remedy was to excise two 
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, thereby rendering the 
Guidelines advisory.154  The Court determined this option was 
consistent with both legislative intent and the Sixth Amendment.155  
According to the Court, sentencing judges would still be required to 
consider the Guidelines when making sentencing decisions, but they 
also would be permitted to tailor sentences in light of other statutory 
factors.156  Because the now-advisory Guidelines did not create 
“statutory maximums” under Apprendi and Blakely, no Sixth 
Amendment concerns were implicated.157  Thus, the Court remedied 
the constitutional infirmities of the Guidelines without completely 
destroying the federal sentencing scheme that had been in place for 
the past twenty years. 
                                                            
 152. See id. at 230–32 (describing protection against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as a basic precept that “provide[s] the basis for . . . 
interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing procedures”). 
 153. Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court rejected the 
argument that the availability of a sentencing departure in specific circumstances 
avoided the constitutional issue, stating that: 
[I]n most cases, as a matter of law, the [Sentencing] Commission will have 
adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departures will be 
legally permissible.  In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a 
sentence within the Guidelines . . . .  It was for this reason we rejected a 
similar argument in Blakely. 
Id. at 234. 
 154. See id. at 245 (excising § 3553(b)(1), which required sentencing courts to 
impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range, and § 3742(e), which set 
forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the 
applicable guidelines range). 
 155. See id. at 246–49 (concluding that Congress would likely have preferred the 
excision of two provisions to the invalidation of the Sentencing Reform Act in its 
entirety). 
 156. Id. at 245–46. 
 157. See id. at 259 (“With [the] two sections excised . . . the remainder of the Act 
satisfies the Court’s constitutional requirements.”). 
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As clever as the Booker opinion might have been in avoiding a 
wholesale invalidation of the Guidelines, it was not exactly a bastion 
of clarity.  Professor Douglas Berman has commented: 
The Booker decision, remarkable for many reasons, found a way to 
make a conceptually muddled constitutional jurisprudence 
concerning sentencing procedures even more opaque . . . . 
Through the dual rulings of dueling majorities, the Supreme Court 
in Booker declared that the federal sentencing system could no 
longer rely upon mandated and tightly directed judicial fact-
finding, and as a remedy it created a system which now depends 
upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding.  Thus, 
to culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking to vindicate the 
role of the jury and to require a new set of sentencing procedures 
in modern sentencing systems, the so-called “remedial majority” in 
Booker devised a new system of federal sentencing which granted 
judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously 
wielded and seemingly endorsed the entire panoply of relatively lax 
sentencing procedures that had been used in the federal system 
over the prior two decades.158 
Just as Lockett had done previously, Booker transformed the legal 
landscape, but it failed to give clear direction to sentencing judges 
and those practicing sentencing advocacy.  It was certain that judges 
now had considerably more discretion to conduct individualized 
sentencing; less certain was how that discretion would be exercised in 
practice.  Could judges essentially ignore the Guidelines and base 
sentences on any mitigating or aggravating factor?  How would 
attorneys react to Booker’s new grant of judicial discretion—would 
they continue to act as if the Guidelines were still binding and do 
nothing, or would they, as some in the capital realm had done, look 
at sentencing creatively and become more effective advocates?  And 
what would be the nuances of post-Booker appellate review of 
sentences inside and outside of the Guidelines? 
Since Booker, the Court has continued to address the operation of 
the now-advisory federal sentencing system in an attempt to answer 
these questions.  In Rita v. United States,159 the Court held that courts 
of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness standard when 
reviewing a sentence imposed within a properly-calculated Guidelines 
range.160  The Court emphasized the close relationship between the 
Guidelines and the sentencing objectives stated in 18 U.S.C. 
                                                            
 158. Berman, supra note 116, at 676. 
 159. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 160. Id. at 347. 
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§ 3553(a), the broad statutory sentencing factors underlying the 
Sentencing Reform Act.161  The Court stated that a reasonableness 
presumption reflects the “double determination” of the § 3553(a) 
factors and the Guidelines, which require “the same conclusion as to 
the proper sentence in [a] particular case.”162  According to the 
Court, an appellate court could presume a sentence within the 
Guidelines was reasonable because the Guidelines “reflect a rough 
approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s 
objectives.”163 
In Gall v. United States,164 the Court addressed the flipside of Rita, 
holding that a presumption of unreasonableness did not apply to a 
sentence outside the Guidelines.165  The Court rejected the 
proportionality calculus used by some circuit courts in reviewing 
sentences because such a calculus came “too close to creating an 
impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences 
outside the Guidelines range.”166  In Kimbrough v. United States,167 
decided the same day as Gall, the Court continued to refine the 
bounds of judicial sentencing discretion by holding that a judge 
could reasonably grant a downward variance from the sentencing 
range based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines.168 
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough also clarified important procedural issues 
left open by Booker.  The Court explained that when sentencing a 
defendant, a district judge must follow a three-step process.  First, the 
judge must calculate the applicable Guidelines range.169  Then, the 
                                                            
 161. Id. at 345; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (providing that “[t]he Court shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the 
specific purposes codified in the statute). 
 162. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. 
 163. Id. at 350.  The Court has further clarified that the presumption of 
reasonableness does not apply at the district court level; the presumption is only 
applicable on appeal.  See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per 
curiam) (“The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are 
also not to be presumed reasonable.”). 
 164. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 165. See id. at 41 (“[C]ourts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, 
just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 166. Id. at 47. 
 167. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 168. See id. at 111 (determining that in light of the inconsistencies and particular 
circumstances of the case, a reviewing court could not rationally find the sentence 
reduction to be an abuse of discretion).  In Kimbrough, the Court upheld the district 
court’s below-Guidelines sentence based on the judge’s disagreement with the 
hundred-to-one ratio for crack versus powder cocaine sentences.  See id. at 91. 
 169. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (explaining that “the Guidelines should be the 
starting point and the initial benchmark” at sentencing); Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (finding that a judge will usually consider the presentence 
report first and how it affects the guidelines). 
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judge must determine whether to depart from the sentencing range 
in situations falling outside the “heartland” of cases to which the 
Guidelines were intended to apply.170  Third, after the sentencing 
range is calculated, the judge must “then consider all of the 
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence 
requested.”171  A judge is free to provide a “variance” if he decides an 
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted.172  Appellate courts 
reviewing sentences must also follow a prescribed structure:  first 
determining whether the sentencing court committed a procedural 
error by miscalculating the Guidelines, then determining whether 
the sentence was substantively reasonable under an abuse of 
discretion standard.173 
With its Kimbrough decision, the Court had gone far in clarifying 
the procedural and substantive boundaries of the advisory guidelines 
system.174  But not until Pepper v. United States175 did the Court 
unequivocally establish the breadth of a district court’s “wide 
discretion” at sentencing.  The decision allowed courts to consider 
the “fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 
characteristics”176  and brought federal sentencing much in line with 
the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence developed twenty years 
prior. 
In Pepper, the Court was asked to determine whether a district court 
could consider evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing 
rehabilitation at resentencing.177  Based on a large downward 
departure under the Guidelines, Jason Pepper was originally 
sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to 
distribute methamphetamine.178  The government appealed, arguing 
the departure was too great.179  After a Booker remand, the district 
court resentenced Pepper to the original sentence, this time based 
                                                            
 170. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351. 
 171. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50. 
 172. Id. at 50. 
 173. Id. at 51. 
 174. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007).  Between Rita, Gall, and 
Kimbrough, the Court had sanctioned the sentencing court’s consideration of a 
number of mitigating factors:  withdrawal from a criminal drug conspiracy, 
possessing a college degree and starting a successful business, support of family and 
friends, age at time of the offense, lack of criminal history, military experience, 
vulnerability in prison, physical condition, and the unjust effect of a particular 
provision in the Guidelines.  Id.; Gall, 552 U.S. at 43–44; Rita, 551 U.S. at 344–45. 
 175. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). 
 176. Id. at 1233 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 46–47 (1949)). 
 177. Id. at 1235–36. 
 178. Id. at 1236. 
 179. United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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partly on his post-sentencing rehabilitation, which included 
successful drug treatment, a straight-A performance as a full-time 
college student, steady employment, and strong family support.180  
Following a second government appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that “evidence of [defendant]’s post-sentencing 
rehabilitation is not relevant and will not be permitted at 
resentencing,” and the case was once again remanded.181  Without 
the benefit of his post-sentencing rehabilitation arguments, Pepper 
was resentenced to sixty-five months imprisonment.182  Pepper 
appealed again, and this time the Eighth Circuit sustained the 
sentence.183 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor reversed the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision.184  The Court’s opinion began by echoing the 
language of its capital cases:  “It has been uniform and constant in 
the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider 
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique 
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes 
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”185  The Court went 
on to state, again quoting from capital cases, that it was “essential” 
that the district court “consider the widest possible breadth of 
                                                            
 180. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236. 
 181. United States v. Pepper, 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Jenners, 473 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 2007)), vacated, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008).  A 
policy statement in the Guidelines against considering post-sentencing rehabilitation, 
section 5K2.19 (2010) (“Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts”), formed the basis of 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision.  Compare Pepper, 486 F.3d at 413, with U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.19 cmt. (2011) (“[P]ost-sentencing rehabilitative 
measures should not provide a basis for downward departure when resentencing a 
defendant initially sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . . .”). 
 182. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1238.  Because he had already served his original twenty-
four-month sentence, Pepper would have had to surrender to the Bureau of Prisons 
for an additional forty-one months, likely losing his job and apartment in the 
process. 
 183. Id.  Pepper had an intervening trip up to the Eighth Circuit and back down for 
resentencing; all told, the case was before the Eighth Circuit four times and the 
Supreme Court twice.  See United States v. Pepper, 570 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 1229; United States v. Pepper, 518 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 
2008); Pepper, 486 F.3d 408; Pepper, 412 F.3d 995. 
 184. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1250 (rejecting “the Court of Appeals’ erroneous views 
regarding post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence”). 
 185. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).  
Compare id. at 1240 (highlighting that the punishment should fit the individual 
offender, including not only the facts of the crime at issue but also the defendant’s 
character), with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (discussing the 
“diverse frailties of humankind” that must be explored in death penalty cases while 
considering both the “offender and the offense”). 
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information about the defendant” to ensure that the sentence “will 
suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.”186 
The Court found that the language of the Sentencing Reform Act 
surviving after Booker did not constrain judicial sentencing discretion; 
indeed, it “preserved the traditional discretion of sentencing courts 
to ‘conduct an inquiry broad in scope [and] largely unlimited’” in 
the kind of information that may be considered.187  “In determining 
the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a 
departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, 
without limitation, any information concerning the background, 
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited 
by law.”188  The Court therefore held that a district court may 
consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation at resentencing 
and grant a downward variance when appropriate as part of the 
court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.189  Because this 
conclusion conflicted with a statutory provision that precluded a 
court on resentencing from imposing a sentence outside “the 
Guidelines range except upon a ‘ground of departure’ that was 
expressly relied upon in the prior sentencing,” the Court invalidated 
the provision as inconsistent with Booker.190 
B. The Current State of White Collar Sentencing 
Much has been written about the Booker line of cases and their 
impact on federal sentencing.  Suffice it to say, the Booker decision 
was a bombshell, a massive “aftershock” of Blakely that continues to 
“surprise and confound” judges, practitioners, and academics.191  Just 
a few years ago, few observers would have expected the sentencing 
landscape to look as it does today.  In less than a decade, a 
determinate sentencing guidelines system that “mandated and tightly 
directed judicial fact-finding”192 was transformed into one that 
                                                            
 186. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 187. Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). 
 188. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3661 (2006))). 
 189. Id. at 1241. 
 190. See id. at 1244 (explaining that Booker rendered the Guidelines “effectively 
advisory by invalidating . . . [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), which prescribed the standard of 
appellate review, including de novo review of Guidelines departures”). 
 191. Berman, supra note 116, at 670, 675.  “The potential impact of Blakely on 
modern sentencing systems is truly staggering because the decision not only 
redefined the reach of Apprendi, but also suggests that any and every fact legally 
essential to the punishment must be either proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
jury or admitted by the defendant.”  Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 192. Id. at 676. 
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depends upon discretion and allows judges to consider “without 
limitation” a defendant’s “background, character, and conduct.”193  
With the Pepper decision, the Court’s federal sentencing 
jurisprudence appears to be traveling a similar arc to that of its 
capital jurisprudence, in which individualized determinations by a 
sentencer possessed of wide discretion are paramount in the 
sentencing process.  But the question remains:  What does this mean 
for federal defendants, particularly white collar defendants such as 
Bernie Madoff, who are facing the upward ratchet of higher 
sentences? 
Booker and its progeny have had a number of significant practical 
effects in white collar cases.  First, and most fundamentally, courts 
now have almost unrestrained discretion to impose a sentence.194  
There is no more forced rigidity in sentencing.  Booker eliminated the 
required adherence to the Guidelines, replacing it with discretion 
bounded by the broad statutory sentencing factors underlying the 
Sentencing Reform Act.195  The § 3553(a) factors had always governed 
sentencing,196 but because the Guidelines were mandatory and 
provided much more specific guidance during a sentencing 
calculation,197 courts and litigators paid the sentencing statute little 
attention.198  Now, with the Guidelines just one factor among many, 
§ 3553(a) is the driving force at sentencing.199  And as Pepper made 
clear, Congress, through its statutory language, “expressly preserved” 
                                                            
 193. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1252 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661)). 
 194. See Berman, supra note 116, at 676 (describing the emergence of “a system 
which now depends upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding” 
and “grant[s] judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously 
wielded”). 
 195. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 196. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (establishing the “kinds of sentence and the 
sentencing range” for the “applicable category of offense committed . . . [or] in the 
case of violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (2011). 
 197. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1. 
 198. Although somewhat anecdotal, a review of a sample of defense sentencing 
submissions and sentencing opinions prior to Booker reveals little or no mention of 
§ 3553(a) factors; if the section is referenced, it is in passing.  The focus is always on 
application and operation of the Guidelines.  This is consistent with the author’s 
experience defending federal white collar clients prior to Booker. 
 199. See AMY BARON-EVANS, NAT’L FED. DEFENDER SENTENCING RES. COUNSEL, RITA, 
GALL AND KIMBROUGH:  A CHANCE FOR REAL SENTENCING IMPROVEMENTS 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/rita-gall-kimbrough-
sentencing-strategies-5-11-08.pdf (“Section 3553(a)(1) requires the sentencing court 
to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant in every case, and the statute trumps any guideline 
or policy statement to the contrary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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the traditional discretion of sentencing courts to consider “largely 
unlimited” information regarding the defendant’s conduct.200  The 
standard of appellate review as clarified by Rita and Gall also 
strengthens district courts’ discretion.  A court that follows the 
correct procedure—first determining the Guidelines range, and then 
sentencing pursuant to § 3553(a)—will have a sentence overturned 
only if it is unreasonable.201  It should be obvious then why Judge 
Denny Chin felt free to sentence Madoff to a largely “symbolic” 
sentence that was 100 years more than recommended by the 
probation department—he knew he could.202 
Second, flowing from the increase in judicial discretion afforded by 
Booker, advocates may now make a wide variety of arguments at 
sentencing.  Booker, like Lockett in the death penalty context, opened 
the door to a variety of new mitigating arguments previously 
unavailable to defense counsel.203  And Pepper, like Williams, signaled 
to advocates just how important the development of mitigating 
evidence could be to support those arguments.204  Advocates are no 
longer constrained by the Guidelines commentary or policy 
                                                            
 200. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011). 
 201. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“Assuming that the district 
court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then 
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.”). 
 202. Madoff Transcript, supra note 24, at 4, 49.  Madoff chose not to appeal his 
sentence given the obvious futility.  Even if he had, however, it is extremely unlikely 
the Second Circuit would have found the sentence procedurally defective or 
substantively unreasonable.  See Allan Chernoff, Madoff Won’t Appeal 150-year Sentence, 
Attorney Says, CNN.COM (July 9, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-
09/justice/madoff.appeal_1_bernard-madoff-madoff-attorney-district-judge-denny-
chin? (labeling Madoff’s sentence as “symbolic” of the severity of his crime, despite 
the insistence of his attorney that “people are not symbols” and “are sentenced 
under a reasonable standard”). 
 203. Of course, prosecutors are also allowed to argue more freely at sentencing.  
However, they are generally less likely to argue for variances from the Guidelines 
based on something other than substantial assistance or safety valve relief.  Moreover, 
the government has always been a staunch supporter of determinate sentencing and 
curtailing judicial discretion as a way to reduce sentencing disparity.  See Letter from 
Lanny A. Breuer to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Sept. 2, 
2011), reprinted in 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 137 (2011) (setting out the Department of 
Justice’s goals for federal sentencing policy, which include “eliminat[ing] 
unwarranted sentencing disparities”); Letter from Jonathan J. Wrobleski, Dir. of 
Office of Policy and Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions, 
Chair, U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, (June 28, 2010), reprinted in 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
282 (2011) (lamenting a “significant set of criminal cases . . . sentenced by judges 
who regularly impose sentences outside the applicable guidelines range irrespective 
of offense type or nature of the offender”). 
 204. See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (emphasizing the importance of mitigating 
evidence and the underlying principle that “the punishment should fit the offender 
and not merely the crime” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 
(1949))). 
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statements.205  Instead, a defendant may argue “without limitation” any 
mitigating evidence concerning the background, character, or 
conduct of the defendant in order to achieve a sentence within the 
Guidelines range, a Guideline-sanctioned departure, or a “variance” 
outside the Guidelines pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors.206 
Indeed, the § 3553(a) factors offer an incredibly broad range of 
possible mitigating arguments at sentencing.  Section 3553(a) begins 
with an overarching mandate:  “[C]ourt[s] shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes [of the statute].”207  The statute goes on to direct courts to 
consider almost anything related to the defendant or his potential 
punishment: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
shall consider—  
 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant; 
 (2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and 
 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment 
in the most effective manner; 
 (3) the kinds of sentences available; 
 (4) the kinds of sentence and the [Guidelines] sentencing 
range . . . 
 . . . 
 (5) any pertinent policy statement [contained in the 
Guidelines] . . . 
                                                            
 205. See id. at 1239, 1241 (explaining that, though a sentencing court must “give 
respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker permits the court to tailor the 
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well” (quoting Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007))). 
 206. Id. at 1240–41. 
 207. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  This provision embodies the “parsimony 
principle,” which has been described as requiring “a sentencing court when handing 
down a sentence [to] be stingy enough to avoid one that is too long, but also that it 
be generous enough to avoid one that is too short.”  United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 
1160, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A 
View from the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2002) (defining the “parsimony principle” as a 
judge imposing “a sentence only long enough to achieve the purposes of sentencing, 
but no longer”). 
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 . . . 
 (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . . and 
 (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.208 
In addition, a companion provision states that “[n]o limitation 
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, 
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a 
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose 
of imposing an appropriate sentence.”209  This expansive language 
sounds strikingly similar to the Supplementary Guidelines’ directives to 
mitigation specialists regarding the areas they must investigate during 
a social history investigation.210  And just as in the capital context, the 
“fundamental point” is that sentencing mitigation arguments have 
essentially “no boundaries” under current federal law.211 
Increased judicial discretion and the broad ability of advocates to 
argue the § 3553(a) factors lead to a third practical effect of Booker.  
Sentences, particularly for white collar defendants, are becoming 
increasingly separated from the sentencing ranges calculated under 
the Guidelines.  Prior to Booker, judges granted non-governmental 
sponsored below-Guidelines-range sentences in only 5.5% of cases.212  
                                                            
 208. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 209. Id. § 3661. 
 210. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (directing the Sentencing Commission to 
consider a defendant’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional 
condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment, 
family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, 
and the degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood when creating 
the Guidelines), with Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 679 (“Mitigation 
evidence includes . . . compassionate factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind, . . . vulnerabilities related to mental health, explanations of patterns of 
behavior, negation of aggravating evidence regardless . . . positive acts or qualities, 
responsible conduct in other areas of life . . . .”).  However, the Commission “seized 
upon criminal history as highly relevant,” but concluded other factors were not.  See 
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing:  Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based 
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1346 (2011). 
 211. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 240; see O’Brien, When Life 
Depends on It, supra note 37, at 713 (noting that “the scope of mitigation evidence [is] 
‘potentially infinite’” and “‘anything under the sun’ can be tendered by the defense 
in mitigation of punishment” (footnotes omitted)).  Of course, there are bounds to 
what evidence an advocate may introduce at a sentencing hearing.  See FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 32(i)(2) (allowing parties to introduce evidence at a sentencing hearing, but 
requiring witness testimony to comply with certain rules). 
 212. See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of J. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, 
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) (discussing non-governmental sponsored below 
Guidelines range sentences during the post-PROTECT Act period, i.e., the time after 
the PROTECT Act was passed, which attempted to curtail departures and increase 
appellate review of below-Guidelines sentences, and before Booker).  Government 
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In the year after Booker, that number jumped to 12.5%.213  Since then, 
there has been a steady increase of below Guidelines range sentences, 
rising to a peak of 17.8% in 2010,214 and now sitting at 17.4%.215  The 
trend for fraud offenses216 is even more pronounced.  Non-
governmental sponsored below-Guidelines range sentences in fraud 
cases rose from 6.2% prior to Booker, to 16.4% after Booker, and now 
sit at 22.6%.217  This means that judges, following arguments raised by 
counsel at sentencing, are increasingly willing to exercise their 
discretion and sentence defendants, including white collar 
defendants, outside the Guidelines. 
While the statistics demonstrate that judges are more often being 
persuaded to sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range, this 
does not mean judicial discretion is always exercised in a white collar 
defendant’s favor.  Nor does it mean a defendant’s sentence will be 
minimal even if the court grants a variance.  In fact, many contend 
the sentencing of white collar defendants, particularly those of high-
loss offenders such as Madoff, has retained all of its “harshness.”218  
Some say, more pointedly, that white collar sentencing, even under 
the advisory Guidelines system, is completely “out of whack” 219 and 
“patently absurd on [its] face.”220  Critics cite the steady increases in 
                                                            
sponsored below-Guidelines sentences include substantial assistance departures 
(section 5K1.1) and safety valve departures (section 5K3.1), which are incorporated 
into the Guidelines.  Because government sponsored below-range sentences are 
granted pursuant to the Guidelines, non-governmental sponsored below range 
sentences are the best measure of whether the Guidelines are being followed by 
sentencing courts. 
 213. See id. (discussing the changes in below-Guidelines sentencing after Booker). 
 214. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS fig.G [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/FigureG.pdf. 
 215. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.N [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/TableN.pdf. 
 216. The Sentencing Commission does not consistently break out statistics for 
white collar offenses; the fraud offense category includes most white collar crimes, as 
well as other forms of economic crimes sentenced under section 2B1.1.  Id. tbl.27. 
 217. Id. tbl.27A.  The numbers are even higher when focusing on offenders 
sentenced under the economic fraud guideline, section 2B1.1, which would include 
the vast majority of white collar offenders.  See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, White Collar 
Sentencing Data Fiscal Year 2005–Fiscal Year 2009, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 128 (2009) 
[hereinafter White Collar Sentencing Data].  In fiscal year 2011, 22.9% of section 2B1.1 
offenders received a non-governmental sponsored below range sentence.  2011 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 214, tbl.27A.  The limited data available focusing specifically 
on white collar offenders indicates that current non-governmental sponsored below 
range sentences top twenty-five percent.  White Collar Sentencing Data, supra. 
 218. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 172 (concluding that the 
Guidelines sentences are drastically severe). 
 219. Id. 
 220. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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the Guidelines ranges for economic crimes and public outrage over 
high-profile corporate scandals as the reason white collar defendants 
are being sentenced drastically higher than in the past.221  As 
Professor Frank Bowman points out, “[u]nder the current 
Guidelines,” which are the starting point for determining a federal 
sentence, “a judge who wanted to impose a twenty-five-year sentence 
on an Ebbers, Skilling, or a Rigas, thus equating their economic 
offenses with murder by a five-time felon, would have to depart 
downward nineteen offense levels to do it.”222  Putting aside whether these 
types of “marquee corporate convicts” are deserving of such lengthy 
sentences, it can hardly be argued that white collar defendants have 
significantly more exposure at sentencing than they did in years 
past.223 
In short, federal white collar sentencing is in a schizophrenic state.  
Despite the increased opportunities to argue for a below-Guidelines 
sentence based on expanded judicial sentencing discretion post-
Booker, white collar defendants still routinely face harsh, and many 
times extreme, penalties.  If a white collar defendant commits a high 
loss crime, he could face a sentence comparable to that of the most 
reviled corporate offenders—the Skillings, Ebbers, and Madoffs of 
the world—possibly resulting in a Guidelines sentence of life 
imprisonment.224  Yet that same defendant might be able to persuade 
a judge to exercise his wide discretion and grant a downward variance 
from the Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of a few years.225  This 
                                                            
 221. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169 (discussing the sentences of 
high-profile white collar criminals); Felman, supra note 127, at 138 (explaining how 
the Guidelines were increased in response to high-profile scandals). 
 222. Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169. 
 223. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756–63 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (cataloging the calculated Guidelines ranges and sentences of recent white 
collar defendants). 
 224. See Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 168 (demonstrating the increases 
in potential sentences for corporate defendants convicted of high-loss frauds). 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(sentencing a defendant involved in an identity theft conspiracy with total loss of 
more than $200 million to twenty-four months on a sentencing range calling for life 
imprisonment).  Concerns over inconsistencies in financial fraud sentences have also 
been expressed by Lanny Breuer, head of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal 
Division.  See Joe Palazzolo, Proceedings:  Highlights from the Law Blog, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
21, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000142405297020371070457705027282 
2256642.html (quoting Breuer, “[a] defendant in one district may be sentenced to 
one or two years in prison for causing hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, while 
a defendant in another district is sentenced to ten or twenty years in prison for 
causing much smaller losses”); see also, Reynolds Holding, Rajaratnam Sentence Shows 
Value of Court Process, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:35 PM IST), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/10/13/idINIndia-59881220111013 (discussing 
the unpredictability of white collar sentences and arguing a defendant’s “tough 
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level of risk and reward compels white collar counsel to employ 
innovative strategies at sentencing to mitigate their clients’ conduct.226  
As one veteran white collar defense attorney has said, “after years in 
the wilderness, sentencing advocacy . . . is back.”227 
III. THE APPLICATION OF CAPITAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES TO WHITE 
COLLAR CASES 
The above discussion should familiarize white collar counsel with 
the concept of mitigation, its legal framework, and the opportunities 
afforded by the parallel arc of federal sentencing jurisprudence.  It 
should also convince white collar counsel of the critical 
importance—and the “transformative” power—mitigation evidence 
has at sentencing.  But, as in the capital context, counsel still needs to 
know “how to do it properly.”228  The following section provides “best 
practices” mitigation strategies developed and perfected during the 
modern capital sentencing era that can be employed in white collar 
cases. 
Before addressing the specific strategies, however, two caveats are 
in order.  First, mitigation strategies are applicable to all federal 
sentencings, not just white collar sentencings.  However, white collar 
defendants are particularly well-suited to learn from and employ 
mitigation techniques.  White collar defendants, unlike many in the 
federal criminal system, often have the resources to implement the 
strategies.229  Employing a team of attorneys and mitigation specialists, 
and allowing them to spend the necessary time developing mitigation 
evidence (which requires hours of one-on-one interviews and 
extensive document review), is out of reach for most defendants.230  
Additionally, as discussed, judges may be more willing to credit 
                                                            
defense” helped the sentencing judge “get it about right” when sentencing him to 
eleven years). 
 226. See, e.g., Alan Ellis, Inside Baseball:  Interview with Former Federal Probation Officer, 
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2007, at 36, 36 (suggesting the defense bar cannot “simply act 
like ‘business as usual’” and urging the use of mitigation techniques in white collar 
cases).  Although Madoff’s sentencing is the highest-profile example, there is 
evidence that the defense community as a whole has not altered its approach to 
sentencing to fully take advantage of Booker and its progeny.  See id. (urging all 
defense attorneys to adopt mitigation strategies). 
 227. MARVIN PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIMES § 7:10 (2011), available at Westlaw 
SECCRIM. 
 228. Maher, supra note 95, at 769. 
 229. See Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, The Cost of Defense, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 
2007, available at http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00136/_res/id= 
Attachments/index=0/07008070012Morvillo.pdf (explaining that many white collar 
defendants have a high net worth or are indemnified by their employer). 
 230. See id. (explaining that the costs of defending a typical white collar case may 
run in the millions of dollars). 
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mitigation evidence as it relates to white collar defendants, 
particularly those in high loss situations, because the Guidelines 
ranges are so “out of whack” as to be “of no help” at sentencing.231  
This provides an opening for white collar counsel to forcefully argue 
for lesser sentences using mitigation strategies.232 
Second, although developing white collar mitigation evidence in 
the manner of capital counsel is necessary in today’s sentencing 
landscape, the goals of doing so are slightly different.  In capital 
cases, counsel is trying to obtain, rather than avoid, a life sentence for 
their client.  This is often accomplished by mitigating the defendant’s 
conduct by focusing on his developmental years, which are often 
defined by violence, abuse, and cognitive impairment.233  Mitigating a 
white collar offender’s conduct is primarily focused on establishing 
the client’s capacity for rehabilitation.  Because many white collar 
defendants have not faced the extreme upbringings as those of 
capital defendants (or at least appear not to have), counsel often 
focuses on demonstrating prior good works. 
However, as will be discussed below, developing mitigation 
evidence can advance both goals for both types of defendants.  While 
not every white collar defendant will share a social history with that of 
an accused killer—not every Madoff is a Kaczynski—some might.  
And even for those that do not, the process of uncovering and 
developing mitigation evidence, whatever it may be, is as important as 
the end result.  The aim of individualized sentencing, a “uniform and 
constant” federal judicial tradition, is predicated on the “unique 
study” of each defendant to be sentenced.234  Developing mitigation 
evidence through the specific strategies outlined in this Article allows 
white collar counsel to conduct that unique study in a thoughtful and 
principled way. 
A. Strategy 1—Change Your Mindset 
The first thing counsel must do to effectively use mitigation 
strategies in white collar cases is change their mindset.  Most 
                                                            
 231. Bowman, Sentencing, supra note 133, at 169, 172; see United States v. Watt, 707 
F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing how the Guidelines provided little 
guidance because they called for a life sentence, which was much higher than the 
statutory maximum sentence of five years). 
 232. See Haney, supra note 26, at 848 (examining how attorneys took advantage of 
advances in psychology).  All defendants, however, will benefit from their counsel 
understanding the current state of federal sentencing law and by viewing sentencing 
advocacy more creatively, as those in the capital realm have done. 
 233. See, e.g., Rompillia v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 391–92 (2005). 
 234. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239–40 (2011). 
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experienced defense attorneys practicing today, as well as most 
judges, cut their sentencing teeth during a time when the Guidelines 
tightly controlled all aspects of a defendant’s sentence.235  In fact, 
prior to 2005, when Booker was decided, most attorneys had practiced 
exclusively under a Guidelines regime.236  This type of familiarity with 
a system creates a certain cognitive inertia that can be hard to 
overcome.237  Modern white collar sentencing advocacy demands 
more, however.  Counsel must start by taking to heart the words of 
the Supreme Court in Pepper:  “In determining the sentence to 
impose . . . the court may consider, without limitation, any information 
concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant 
. . . .”238  The Guidelines, and their rigid formulaic structure that 
precluded consideration of most mitigating factors, no longer 
exclusively control a defendant’s sentence. 
First, the Guidelines are one factor among seven that must be 
addressed at sentencing.239  At least two of the other § 3553(a) 
factors—“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the 
sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner” —speak directly 
to classic notions of mitigation.240  The four other factors, at the very 
                                                            
 235. See Ellis et al., Litigating, supra note 36, at 30 (explaining how attorneys 
became used to the rigid pre-Booker guidelines). 
 236. See id. (discussing how attorneys who grew accustomed to the rigid guidelines 
before Booker should adapt to the sentencing options now available). 
 237. See Ellis et al., Loss for Justice, supra note 128, at 38 (discussing the various 
developments in sentencing for economic offenses).  Cognitive inertia is the 
“tendency or motive to move forward through the cognitive process in the direction 
indicated.”  Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased:  The Influence of 
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141 (2004) 
(“[I]ndividuals, depending on a variety of factors—such as their cognitive load, 
motivations, and affect—will generally process the information as efficiently and 
quickly as possible, choosing the cognitive path of least resistance.”).  Professor 
Nancy Gertner has argued that the phenomenon of cognitive “anchoring” also 
impacts judges’ continued reliance on the Guidelines.  See Nancy Gertner, From 
Omnipotence to Impotence:  American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 
535 (2007) (explaining that the Guidelines had such an impact on judges because 
they cognitively anchored the complex task of determining an offender’s sentence to 
a starting point created by the Guidelines’ numerical framework). 
 238. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.4 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006))). 
 239. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (directing sentencing courts that “in determining 
the particular sentence to be imposed, [they] shall consider . . . the kinds of sentence 
and the [Guidelines] sentencing range”). 
 240. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(D). 
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least, invite courts to consider mitigating arguments,241 as does the 
parsimony principle overriding § 3553(a).  Accordingly, the 
development and presentation of mitigation evidence should be 
equally important to the court’s sentencing determination as a 
Guidelines calculation.  In addition, even when applying the 
Guidelines there is considerably more flexibility to raise mitigating 
arguments than in the past.  Pepper made explicit that its “without 
limitation” language applies not only when a court is considering the 
§ 3553(a) factors, but also at the Guidelines calculation stage.242  
Thus, if the language of a Guidelines’ commentary, application note, 
or policy statement limits a mitigating argument, it is entitled to little 
or no weight.243 
This frees up white collar defense counsel to view sentencings from 
an entirely new perspective, focusing much less on the Guidelines’ 
proscriptions and much more on the development and presentation 
of mitigation evidence.  Advocates must now consider the entire 
panoply of mitigating circumstances surrounding a client.  The ABA 
Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines are an excellent place to start, 
but the development of mitigation evidence is bounded only by an 
advocate’s imagination.244  It is critical for counsel to think creatively 
                                                            
 241. See, e.g., id. § 3553(a)(6) (listing “need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities” as a factor that allows a defendant to argue how his sympathetic social 
history is different than a defendant who received a lengthy sentence for the same 
offense). 
 242. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (“In determining the sentence to impose within the 
guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court 
may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, 
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3661))). 
 243. See id. at 1247 (rejecting argument that policy statement precludes 
consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation by stating that the Court’s post-Booker 
decisions demonstrate that a court can impose a non-Guidelines sentence when it 
disagrees with the Commission’s policy views).  The Court further stated that 
imposing a non-Guidelines sentence is especially appropriate when “the 
[Sentencing] Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not 
reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Indeed, it would be difficult for a court to refuse to consider mitigation evidence 
when calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range, and then a few seconds later take 
that rejected evidence into account when determining whether a variance from the 
range is appropriate.  See id. at 1229 (indicating that all mitigating information may 
be considered at all times up until the court determines a sentence). 
 244. See Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 656–83 (listing more than forty mitigating 
factors broken into four categories:  (1) good character factors; (2) crime 
involvement factors; (3) legal proceedings factors; and (4) disease theory factors); 
Pamela Blume Leonard, A New Profession for an Old Need:  Why a Mitigation Specialist 
Must Be Included on the Capital Defense Team, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1143, 1145–46 (2003) 
(explaining that there is no comprehensive list of mitigating factors, but listing 
eighteen factors advocates should consider, which are taken primarily from the ABA 
Guidelines). 
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about all aspects of their white collar clients—not just the details of 
their crime and how much exposure they have at sentencing, but who 
they are as individuals and what shaped their experiences leading up 
to the moment they will be sentenced.  All mitigating arguments 
should be marshaled and presented at sentencing to create a 
complete picture of the defendant and the impact of the sentence 
imposed.245  In other words, think Kaczynski’s defense, not Madoff’s.  
This requires a significant change in how most white collar defense 
attorneys think about the law, their role as an advocate, and the 
relationship with the client they represent.  As one mitigation expert 
has put it, “[s]ay good-bye to business as usual.”246 
B. Strategy 2—Employ a Team Approach 
To effectively develop mitigation evidence, capital attorneys rely on 
a team approach to defending clients.  This is one of the most 
important strategies used in capital mitigation, and it is one of the 
most straightforward for white collar counsel to adopt.  The ABA 
Guidelines instruct that capital teams should be comprised of no 
fewer than two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist, 
at least one of whom (most likely the mitigation specialist) should be 
qualified to screen for mental or psychological disorders.247  The ABA 
Guidelines make clear that the mitigation specialist holds a special 
position on the defense team, and her role cannot be substituted with 
an investigator or junior attorney.248 
The reasons for employing a team approach in capital cases are 
practical:  A single lawyer, despite his many strengths, does not have 
the time nor the expertise to adequately prepare for the guilt and 
                                                            
 245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (directing the sentencing court to consider all of the 
philosophical justifications for sentencing—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation—as well as the parsimony principle). 
 246. Natman Schaye & Roseann Schaye-Glos, Mitigation in the Death Belt—Twelve 
Steps To Saving Clients’ Lives, CHAMPION, July 2005, at 18, 18; see also CAIT CLARKE ET 
AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING ADVOCACY 2–3 (2003), 
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/tenprinciplestosent 
adv.pdf (discussing how sentencing advocacy is individualized). 
 247.  GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES guideline 10.4(C)(2)(a)–(b) (rev. ed. 2003). 
 248. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 680–81 (setting forth guideline 
4.1, which states that defense counsel has a duty to their client to include a 
mitigation specialist on the defense team); see also Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 
246, at 19 (concluding that a lawyer cannot “fulfill” the role of a mitigation specialist 
because they have different skills, training, and abilities); Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, 
supra note 37, at 249 (distinguishing the different role the mitigation specialist plays 
in a capital defense team in investigating the client’s past (citing Gary Goodpaster, 
The Trial for Life:  Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
299, 323–24 (1983))). 
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penalty phases of a case that involves a thorough investigation of 
mitigating evidence.249  Properly developing a mitigation case requires 
potentially hundreds of hours of one-on-one interviews by someone 
trained to “delve into the defendant’s past to unearth 
circumstances . . . that might be used to paint a sympathetic picture 
and sway a jury toward leniency.” 250  A lawyer busy interviewing 
witnesses, analyzing documents, and arguing legal motions in 
preparation for trial will simply not have time to develop mitigation 
evidence to be used during sentencing.  Even if the lawyer somehow 
had the time, he does not possess the right skill set to complete a 
mitigation investigation.  Attorneys do not have the “experience nor 
the training necessary to recognize every potential mitigating factor 
when examining a defendant’s records or interviewing a witness.”251  
Put another way, “[l]aw school prepares one to be an advocate, not 
an investigator[.]”252  Further, clients and witnesses “widely 
consider[] [attorneys] to be intimidating.”253  Defendants and their 
families, the main source for mitigating evidence, often initially 
distrust their counsel and are therefore less likely to divulge 
                                                            
 249. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 19. 
 250. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1143. 
 251. Daniel L. Payne, Building the Case for Life:  A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity 
and a Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 49 (2003); see Craig Haney, The Social Context 
of Capital Murder:  Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
547, 605–06 (1995) (stating that “the task of compiling background and social 
history information is so foreign to criminal defense work generally”); Russell 
Stetler, Why Capital Cases Require Mitigation Specialists (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/998934720.005/document_info 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012)[hereinafter Stetler, Mitigation Specialists].  Stetler argues 
that: 
Evidence presented in a typical trial is designed to answer questions 
relating to discrete events such as whether the car went through a red light 
at the time of the accident or whether defendant had the intent to kill at 
the time he fired the fatal shot.  Mitigating evidence, on the other hand, 
deals with broad stretches of history.  In order to explain the kind of 
person the defendant is and the reason for his crime, witnesses may need 
to testify to the defendant’s entire life, including events occurring before 
he was born.  To present such evidence effectively, counsel should review a 
great mass of material to identify witnesses and events that will make the 
defendant’s life meaningful to the sentencer. 
Stetler, Mitigation Specialists, supra, at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 252. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 252 (observing that a 
“mitigation specialist investigates a different factual universe and needs a wholly 
different set of skills” than a lawyer); Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If 
You Don’t:  The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
359, 364 (1997) (recognizing that without a mitigation specialist “the defendant 
probably has little or no chance of avoiding the death sentence unless the defense 
[team] gives the jury something to counter both the horror of the crime and the 
limited information the prosecution has introduced about the defendant”). 
 253. Payne, supra note 251, at 49. 
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embarrassing or sensitive information that could be key to a 
mitigation case.254 
The reasons for using the team approach in capital cases apply 
equally in white collar cases.  While a four-person team may not be 
possible in every white collar matter, it should be the starting point 
for case staffing, not the exception.  Realistically, most white collar 
cases handled by large or medium-sized firms will have at least six 
attorneys of varying experience levels assigned to the case, as well as a 
slew of paralegals and case managers.  Finding room for an 
investigator and a mitigation specialist (who often work at lower rates 
than even first-year attorneys) should not create a hardship.255 
A white collar team, regardless of its size, must include an 
experienced mitigation specialist.  The fundamental task of the 
mitigation specialist is to conduct a comprehensive social history 
investigation of the defendant and identify all areas of relevant 
mitigation, often through one-on-one interviews with the defendant 
and his family, friends, and acquaintances.256  The Supplementary 
Guidelines set forth in detail the qualifications a mitigation specialist 
must have and how mitigation evidence is developed,257 but the 
following provides a concise summary that white collar counsel may 
use as a guide: 
Counsel’s duty . . . to thoroughly investigate the background and 
circumstances of the client’s life and to present all relevant 
mitigating evidence mandates the conducting of an extensive life 
history study, as well as an analysis of the factors and forces that 
influenced the client’s development, including personality and 
behavior.  The history must be multi-generational in nature, 
                                                            
 254. Id.  Lawyers are not the only members of the defense team that lack the 
necessary skills to investigate mitigation evidence.  See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, 
supra note 37, at 248–49 (“A significant legal blind spot exists between the roles 
played by the private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard information-
getters in the trial process.  Neither one [is] suited to the task at hand here—namely 
discovering and then communicating the complex human reality of the defendant’s 
personality in a sympathetic way.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Betsy 
Wilson, Creating a Capital-Defense Team That is More Than the Sum of Its Parts, 
CORNERSTONE, May-Aug. 2010, at 2, 2 (discussing the barriers between various 
professions working together). 
 255. See Leonard, supra note 244, at 1154 (arguing that a mitigation specialist 
provides more reliable procedures); Payne, supra note 251, at 50 (arguing that 
appointing a mitigation specialist ultimately saves money).  As a frame of reference, 
the last white collar case the author was involved in defending at a large Chicago firm 
was staffed with two capital partners, an income partner, a senior associate, a mid-
level associate, a junior associate, a paralegal, and two case managers.  The client also 
had local counsel consisting of at least two attorneys and an assistant.  Each of the 
two co-defendants had similarly staffed legal teams. 
 256. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1145. 
 257. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 104, at 682 (guidelines 5.1(B) and (C)). 
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assessing the effects of heredity and the inter-generational 
transmissions of patterns of behavior, and must be broad in scope.  
It involves investigation that goes beyond the individual, family, 
school, and neighborhood to include an examination of socio-
economic, political, cultural, and environmental influences in the 
client’s life. 
The social history investigation and psycho-social assessment 
should be conducted by a professional with skills and expertise not 
generally possessed by attorneys.  It should be done by someone 
with an understanding of child and human development, including 
the manner in which development is influenced and the person 
shaped by heredity and environment.  Skills in interviewing and 
information gathering, including the collection and analysis of life 
history records, are essential.  The interviewing techniques 
employed in the social history investigation are different from 
those generally taught in law schools and employed by lawyers.  
Knowledge regarding human development and factors affecting it 
are necessary in order to know what questions to ask, what 
information to obtain, and how to make sense of that information.  
An awareness of the indicators of such things as cognitive 
impairments, mental illness, childhood abuse and trauma, and 
substance abuse and dependence is essential.  The person 
conducting interviews must have the skills and expertise to assist 
the client, family members, and others in disclosing private, 
shameful, and sensitive information.258 
The professional most qualified to perform these duties is a 
mitigation specialist.259 
A mitigation specialist’s ability to identify mental illness, 
psychological disorders, and the symptoms of addiction cannot be 
overlooked.  White collar offenders, despite their perceived status 
and success, suffer from many of the same disorders as others 
committing crimes.260  Studies have also identified specific negative 
                                                            
 258. Jill Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1117, 1127–28 
(2003); see also SENTENCING PROJECT, THE THINKING ADVOCATE’S LIST OF MITIGATING 
FACTORS (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
listofmitigatingfactors.pdf (referencing a list of mitigating factors to be used by a 
capital defense team). 
 259. See Miller, supra note 258, at 1128 (discussing a study in which lawyers 
stressed the importance of mitigation specialists). 
 260. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 543 (setting forth common psychiatric 
impairments of white-collar criminals).  Almost half of the federal prison population 
suffers from some sort of mental health problem.  See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. 
GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES 2 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Press_ 
September_2006&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentI
D=38175 (indicating in a 2006 study that over 70,000 federal inmates, approximately 
forty-five percent, suffered from mental health problems).  Each year, fraud 
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personality traits common to white collar criminals, such as low 
behavioral self-control, high hedonism, and high narcissism.261  “It 
has been theorized that [white collar criminals] are charismatic, have 
a need-to-control, have a tendency to bully subordinates, fear losing 
their status and position, exhibit narcissistic tendencies, and lack 
integrity and a social conscience.”262  In specific cases, such as 
Madoff’s, white collar offenders have been diagnosed as 
sociopathic.263  It takes a skilled mitigation specialist to identify these 
personality traits, draw them out for investigation, and then develop 
                                                            
offenders, which include white collar defendants, account for approximately 
fourteen percent of all offenders sentenced in federal court.  See 2010 SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 214, fig.A (including the categories of fraud and non-fraud white collar 
offenders, as defined by the Sentencing Commission).  Of those sentenced, 
approximately sixty-eighty percent receive a term of imprisonment.  See id. tbl.12 
(averaging the total percentages of those offenders receiving a sentence of 
imprisonment in fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax, and 
money laundering cases).  It would be surprising then if white collar offenders did 
not make up a sizable group of prison inmates that have been identified as suffering 
from mental health problems.  This conclusion is supported by the reflections of 
many federal judges.  See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Judge in Famous “Rosie D” Case Reflects:  
“What Are People for?”, WBUR (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:50 PM), 
http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2011/12/rosie-d-judge.  Judge Michael A. Ponsor 
commented, “I can tell you from experience that a solid majority of the adults that 
come before me in federal court as criminal defendants suffer from mental health 
disorders that can easily be traced to childhood and that are directly linked to the 
adult’s criminal behavior.”  Id. 
 261. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 543 (discussing psychiatric profiles of 
white collar criminals).  Cornell Medical School Professor Robert B. Millman has 
identified a psychological dysfunction specific to the wealthy, including athletes and 
politicians, called acquired situational narcissism.  See Stephen Sherrill, The Year In 
Ideas:  A to Z.; Acquired Situational Narcissism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/09/magazine/the-year-in-ideas-a-to-z-acquired-
situational-narcissism.html (explaining that like classical narcissism, the personality 
disorder has symptoms of lack of empathy, grandiose fantasies, excessive need for 
approval, rage, social isolation, and depression).  “[F]or the acquired situational 
narcissists . . . [t]heir marriages fall apart, they make lousy parents, they take copious 
quantities of drugs, they get into trouble with the law.  ‘Because they truly don’t 
believe the world is real . . . they begin to think they’re invulnerable.’”  Sherrill, 
supra. 
 262. See Price & Norris, supra note 27, at 542 (discussing the characteristics of the 
typical white-collar offender).  See generally Tage Alalehto, Economic Crime:  Does 
Personality Matter?, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2003) 
(studying the effect of personality traits on economic crimes); Drew Feeley, 
Personality, Environment, and the Causes of White-Collar Crime, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
201 (2006) (discussing the research and theories on the behavioral and 
environmental causes of white collar crime). 
 263. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 435 (discussing how sociopathic individuals can 
charm others into schemes); Ackerman, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing whether 
Madoff has sociopathic tendencies).  But see Ernest Poortinga et al., A Case Control 
Study:  White-Collar Defendants Compared with Defendants Charged with Other Nonviolent 
Theft, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 82, 87 (2006) (finding white collar criminals did 
not have substantially higher rates of bipolar depression than a control group of 
defendants charged with nonviolent thefts). 
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them into a compelling mitigating factor to be used at sentencing.264  
None of that can be done if a mitigation specialist is not included on 
the white collar defense team. 
C. Strategy 3—Begin Mitigation Work Early 
Thoroughly developing mitigation evidence to be used at 
sentencing is a long and work-intensive process.  The days are gone 
when defense counsel could wait until the presentence report was 
issued, gather a handful of supporting letters from family and friends, 
and prepare a sentencing memorandum to be filed a couple of weeks 
before the sentencing hearing.265  When the Guidelines were 
mandatory and there were few mitigation arguments to be made, this 
approach might have been sufficient.  Now, mitigation must be 
integrated into the entire defense case, and its development begins 
the minute the client walks through the door.  With over ninety 
percent of fraud cases charged ending in a sentencing hearing,266 
there is no reason to wait—mitigation evidence will be necessary in 
practically every federal white collar case. 
The significant time it takes to adequately investigate and develop 
mitigation evidence stems from the method of conducting the 
defendant’s social history investigation.  A social history inquiry is 
intended to be an “unparalleled investigation into [the defendant’s] 
personal and family history,” including their medical, educational, 
correctional, and employment history.267  That level of investigation 
                                                            
 264. It is important for a mitigation specialist to identify a client suffering from a 
mental health condition for a number of reasons.  First, a history of a mental health 
disorder may lessen the defendant’s culpability in the judge’s eyes if that condition 
contributed to the defendant’s criminal conduct.  Because judges often doubt 
mental health claims, a mitigation specialist offers corroboration through 
multigenerational one-on-one interviews with the defendant’s family and a review of 
the relevant medical records.  If no mental health issue was ever documented, a 
mitigation specialist may be able to demonstrate that clear symptoms were present 
despite a lack of documented treatment.  Second, a mental health disorder may 
disrupt the team’s ability to effectively communicate with the client.  For example, 
answers that appear evasive or guarded may be a symptom of an underlying mental 
health issue the mitigation specialist can identify.  Finally, a mitigation specialist can 
ferret out untrue or exaggerated claims of mental health disorders or drug and 
alcohol dependence that some white collar clients might make to justify their 
conduct.  See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 254–58. 
 265. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)–(g) (requiring objections to be made within 
fourteen days of receiving the sentencing memorandum and requiring the probation 
officer to submit a report seven days before the hearing). 
 266. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008-STATISTICAL 
TABLES tbls.4.1 & 5.1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html 
/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf. 
 267. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003) (quoting Stetler, Mitigation 
Evidence, supra note 15, at 35). 
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takes time.  More specifically, each of the two aspects of the 
investigation—record gathering and in-person interviews—require 
many hours of dedicated work. 
As white collar defense attorneys well understand, “[i]t is nearly 
impossible to have lived in this day and age without leaving a long 
paper trail.” 268  A complete investigation of mitigation evidence 
attempts to uncover all records relevant to the defendant beginning 
at the moment of conception.269  While that level of investigation may 
not be feasible in every white collar case, it is important to gather 
documents relating to all stages of the defendant’s life, because each 
may have a mitigating story to tell or lead to critical mitigation 
evidence.  A partial list of documents that should be gathered 
includes medical records, such as birth records, childhood illnesses 
and check-ups, immunizations, mental health records, accidents and 
injuries, psychiatric records, and substance abuse reports; school 
records, such as report cards, psychological testing, health and 
disciplinary records, diplomas, and awards and honors; social service 
records, such as welfare, foster care, and adoption; criminal records, 
both juvenile and adult; employment records, such as resumes, 
promotion and demotions, certifications, and human resources files; 
financial records, such as bank accounts, investment accounts, tax 
returns, business records, and business licenses; social and 
philanthropic giving records, such as membership documents, 
donation receipts, and volunteer logs; military records; and 
immigration records.270  Records collection does not stop with the 
defendant; family, friends, and acquaintances must all be canvassed 
for relevant documents, and a multigenerational search may be 
necessary.271  It is especially important to begin locating document 
                                                            
 268. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20. 
 269. See GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 cmt. (outlining that counsel has a duty to 
thoroughly investigate defendant’s history and criminal conduct); O’Brien, When Life 
Depends on It, supra note 37, at 728–30 (highlighting the importance of conducting 
interviews with those people familiar with the defendant’s life). 
 270. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1146–47.  In addition to paper documents, 
defense teams are now scouring social media for mitigating evidence, even using 
social media websites such as Facebook and MySpace as platforms to “crowd source” 
its collection.  See Ken Strutin, The Role of Social Media in Sentencing Advocacy, N.Y. L.J., 
Sept. 29, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTN.jsp?id=1202472638649&slreturn=1 (reporting that county commissioner Greg 
Skrepenak, who was convicted of federal corruption charges, asked his Facebook 
friends to send character references to his counsel or the judge prior to his 
sentencing). 
 271. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20 (finding that it is “critical to 
obtain records for as many generations as possible” and this can be especially 
challenging if a defendant has a history of mental illness). 
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sources early because records can take months to arrive and some 
records can only be obtained after personal meetings with the record 
holder.272 
In addition to record gathering, “everyone must be interviewed.”273  
This “daunting, but necessary task”274 generally begins with an 
interview of the defendant and then radiates outward to his family, 
friends, neighbors, business associates, and acquaintances.275  The 
idea is for the mitigation specialist to create a complete biography of 
the defendant’s life through a cyclical process of interviewing those 
with whom he has come in contact.276  Veteran mitigation specialists 
describe the interview process as follows: 
The investigation is not complete until the information uncovered 
becomes redundant and provides no new insight.  It is insufficient 
to talk to witnesses only once because each new individual recalls 
different facts and anecdotes; if an aunt provides an account of [a 
mitigating factor] which the mother forgot to mention, it is 
necessary to go back to the mother and ask about it.  Similarly, an 
interview may reveal records that must be obtained, which in turn 
raise new questions, questions which necessitate interviewing 
several witnesses again.277 
Interviews must be conducted in-person, one-on-one, and usually 
in the interviewee’s home to establish trust, as well as to give the 
mitigation specialist an opportunity to observe nonverbal cues that 
could indicate further avenues of investigation.278 
In a complex case, the interview process may involve hundreds of 
hours of work requiring “meticulous attention to detail,” painstaking 
efforts to decipher references, and “patience and sensitivity in 
eliciting disclosures.”279  Although the process can be arduous for a 
                                                            
 272. See id. (explaining that military and Social Security records may take up to a 
year to locate, request, and receive, and sometimes the only way to obtain records is 
by requesting them in-person so the record-holder feels compelled to provide them). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 726–28 (emphasizing 
the importance of interviewing everyone who has ever known the defendant); Payne, 
supra note 251, at 46 (noting that a proper mitigation investigation starts with 
interviewing the family). 
 276. Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 38.  The process is “cyclical, 
rather than linear, because witnesses will [often] need to be re-interviewed when new 
information is discovered.”  Id. 
 277. Id. (quoting Lee Norton, Capital Cases:  Mitigation Investigations, CHAMPION, 
May 1992, at 43, 45). 
 278. Id. at 39; see O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 747 (noting 
that mitigation specialists recognize that as much as sixty-five percent of what is 
communicated by a witness is nonverbal). 
 279. Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 39. 
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white collar defense team, it is singularly important because “the 
defendant’s personal history and family life, his obsessions, 
aspirations, hopes, and flaws” —the heart of a mitigating social 
history to be presented at sentencing—“are rarely a matter of 
physical evidence.”280  Beginning the social history investigation early 
ensures mitigation evidence will be fully developed in time to be used 
throughout the case.281 
D. Strategy 4—Better Understand Your Client by Building Trust 
How many white collar defense attorneys truly understand their 
clients—their motivations, aspirations, and fears?  How many can 
effectively communicate their client’s unique humanity to the 
sentencing judge in a way that compels sympathy?  Capital counsel, 
through the inclusion of mitigation specialists on the defense team, 
have been at the forefront of client-centered sentencing—not just 
effective representation from a legal standpoint, but a type of 
representation that genuinely endeavors to understand and articulate 
to the court the complete person being sentenced.  For white collar 
counsel to do the same, to fully explain the “background, character 
and conduct of the defendant,” they must build a level of trust with 
the client that is not currently the norm.282 
The reasons most white collar counsel lack this level of trust, and 
therefore lack a comprehensive understanding of their client to 
present to the court, are familiar.  An attorney immersed in pre-trial 
investigation or trial preparation does not have the time or the 
training to establish a rapport with the client that allows for the 
unguarded discussions necessary to build genuine trust.283  Moreover, 
most white collar counsel, despite what they may say, do not really 
want to—their training and experience has taught them to view 
client trust as a one-way street, in which the client is to trust the 
lawyer completely, but the lawyer constantly weighs the client’s 
statements for truth and consistency against known evidence.  While 
this may be necessary to be an effective advocate, it is difficult to 
achieve a superior level of client trust necessary to develop mitigation 
evidence under these circumstances. 
                                                            
 280. Stetler, Mitigation Specialists, supra note 251, at 1. 
 281. An additional benefit of beginning the social history investigation early is that 
it will aid in plea negotiations and may help uncover possible prosecution arguments 
to be used at trial or during sentencing.  See Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, 
at 35 n.1 (acknowledging the role that social history investigation had in Kaczynski’s 
plea to avoid the death sentence). 
 282. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011). 
 283. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 19–20. 
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The solution is to use a mitigation specialist as a client liaison.  
Mitigation specialists have the time and the training to talk to the 
client in a way that most attorneys do not.  Mitigation specialists 
approach their interactions with witnesses, including the client, in a 
manner that conveys warmth and friendliness.284  They ask 
“innocuous biographical questions about [the client], his family, his 
well-being, [and the] routine aspects of his daily life.”285  Because 
mitigation specialists spend potentially hundreds of hours with the 
client and his family and friends conducting a social history 
investigation, they know when the client is feeling agitated, scared, 
ignored, or falsely confident, as well as whether the client is telling 
the truth or shading it.286  Mitigation specialists also know when to 
push a client and when to back off, and how to explain to the client 
that investigating mitigation evidence or exploring a plea agreement 
does not mean giving up on guilt or innocence.287  Most importantly, 
mitigation specialists become the client’s truest advocate within the 
defense team, allowing others to test evidence without destroying 
client trust.288  The result is a white collar defense team fully invested 
in the client’s defense and able to “inspire compassion” at 
sentencing.289 
E. Strategy 5—Develop the Most Persuasive Mitigation Evidence 
The breadth of possible mitigating evidence bearing on a capital 
case is astounding.290  Mitigation specialists have identified expansive 
theories of mitigation to take advantage of Lockett’s holding that a 
“sentencer . . . [can]not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
                                                            
 284. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 748. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 20 (noting that a “relationship of 
trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client’s natural resistance to 
disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an effective 
penalty phase defense” (quoting GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE 
OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.5 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003))). 
 287. See Leonard, supra note 244, at 1150 (pointing out that a mitigation specialist 
can “assist the defense counsel in explaining the value of a negotiated plea and the 
risks of a capital trial to the defendant and his family”); O’Brien, When Life Depends on 
It, supra note 37, at 749–50 (“The effective interviewer is an ‘empathic listener,’ who 
‘puts [the client] at ease, is sensitive to his suffering, and expresses his [or her] 
compassion.’  The interviewer’s attitude is critical to full and frank disclosure; she 
must listen non-judgmentally, and ‘elicit data . . . [while] encouraging the patient to 
tell his or her story.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 288. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 744. 
 289. Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 261. 
 290. Leonard, supra note 244, at 1145–46.  For a list of mitigation factors, see 
generally Kirchmeier, supra note 41, at 656–83. 
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any of the circumstances of the offense.”291  This allows a capital 
defense team almost unlimited avenues to pursue when developing a 
mitigation case.  In practice, however, some mitigation arguments 
resonate with juries better than others.  Capital defense attorneys 
understand that to be effective, a mitigation case must focus not just 
on any mitigation evidence but on the right kinds of evidence.292  The 
same applies to the use of mitigation in white collar cases. 
Fortunately, a body of empirical evidence is available to help guide 
white collar attorneys in determining which specific mitigating 
arguments will best persuade a sentencing judge.293  Although every 
sentencer may be swayed to differing degrees, the data points to a 
number of general principles.  First, the defendant should express 
remorse for his crime.294  Sentencers credit defendants who are 
contrite and demonstrate they would not commit future crimes.295  
Second, residual doubt over the defendant’s guilt is a powerful 
mitigating factor.296  Although residual doubt is not mitigation in the 
strict sense, a defendant who raises doubt about his guilt, or at least 
about his culpability, improves his standing at sentencing.297  Third, 
mitigating arguments that focus on “factors that diminish the 
defendant’s individual responsibility for his actions” have a positive 
                                                            
 291. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 292. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21 (noting that mitigation 
specialists analyze the importance of different mitigating information in terms of its 
potential impact). 
 293. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project:  Rationale, Design, and Preview of 
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1043–44 (1995).  This series of studies, known as the 
Capital Juror Project, is a multijurisdictional analysis of how capital juries make their 
sentencing decisions.  Id.; Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital 
Cases:  What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538–39 (1998).  The 
backbone of the studies is a three to four-hour interview of up to 120 capital jurors in 
each of the participating eight states.  Bowers, supra, at 1043.  Jurors are interviewed 
about their views of the crime, the defendant, the victim, the victim’s family, jury 
deliberations, the conduct of counsel, and the jurors’ background.  Garvey, supra, at 
1538.  Although a capital jury’s views may not be a perfect proxy for the views of 
individual district court judges sentencing white-collar defendants, the Project serves 
as the best available indicator of the efficacy of mitigation arguments made before a 
sentencer.  The findings are supported by surveys of federal judges conducting 
sentencings.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGES:  JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.13 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.
pdf (surveying judges’ responses to characteristics of a defendant at sentencing). 
 294. See Garvey, supra note 293, at 1567 (suggesting that defendants should show 
some remorse for their conduct). 
 295. See id. (recommending that the defendant express to the jury he will not “do 
it again”). 
 296. See id. at 1563 (noting that the most effective mitigating evidence raises doubt 
about the defendant’s guilt). 
 297. Id. 
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impact at sentencing.298  Sentencers attach “significant mitigating 
potential” to circumstances demonstrating the defendant’s 
diminished mental capacity, such as history of mental health 
problems, at the time of the offense.299  Defendants who suffered as 
children, and therefore are seen to have lesser responsibility, are also 
credited by sentencers, as are defendants who sought help for their 
problems but were unable to get it.300  However, sentencers have 
“little patience” for defendants who attribute their wrongdoing solely 
to drugs or alcohol.301  White collar defense teams can use these 
findings to focus their broadly investigated mitigation evidence to 
have maximum effect.302 
F. Strategy 6—Present a Compelling Mitigation Case at Sentencing 
To be effective, a comprehensive and consistent mitigation case 
must be presented to the sentencing judge in a compelling way.  
Although most white collar defense attorneys are adept at presenting 
arguments and evidence in motions and through trial testimony, they 
often fall short during sentencing.  Much of this is due to mindset—
white collar counsel often have the idea that a sentencing consists of 
a memorandum to be argued at a simple hearing.303  Instead, white 
collar counsel must view sentencings as capital litigators do—as a 
                                                            
 298. Id. at 1539. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See supra notes 290–301 and accompanying text.  White collar defense teams 
should not try to steer the mitigation investigation toward one of the “high impact” 
factors, however, as doing so would likely artificially limit the breadth and character 
of the mitigation evidence discovered.  Instead, the mitigation expert should 
conduct an exhaustive investigation, present all possible avenues of mitigation to the 
defense team, and then the team can collectively decide which mitigating arguments 
to raise at sentencing based partly on the empirical data discussed above.  Schaye 
& Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21. 
 303. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 23 (stating that attorneys should 
try not to “justify or excuse the crime” but explain it by developing a compelling 
picture of the client’s life).  The risk is especially high when sentencing comes after a 
guilty plea.  If the Guidelines range as calculated by the probation department is 
uncontested or there are only a few offense levels at issue, counsel sometimes views 
the sentencing hearing as pro forma.  Nothing could be less true.  Despite a plea 
agreement, the court is required to sentence the defendant after hearing all 
information related to his background, character, and conduct.  See Pepper v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (holding that courts must consider all mitigating 
evidence).  Further, most plea agreements in white collar cases leave open some 
opportunity to argue for sentencing at the low end of the range, for the application 
of particular specific offense characteristics, or even for variances, all of which 
provide counsel the opportunity to argue mitigation consistent with § 3553(a). 
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continuing and co-equal phase of the case that requires a tightly 
orchestrated presentation of mitigating evidence.304 
As an initial matter, mitigation should be considered as part of the 
overall strategy of a case, not simply as an afterthought to the trial or 
plea negotiation phase.  Because the stakes are so high in death 
penalty cases, capital counsel understand that opportunities to 
present mitigation evidence must be maximized.  Therefore, 
mitigation themes are developed and presented whenever possible 
throughout all phases of a case.305  This means that a mitigating 
narrative is woven into every interaction with the government or the 
court, creating a consistent and compelling picture of the defendant 
as a whole person.306  For example, Kaczynski’s defense team stressed 
his mental health condition (paranoid schizophrenia) at every 
possible opportunity prior to trial.307  This helped persuade the 
government to accept Kaczynski’s guilty plea to a life sentence in a 
seemingly certain death penalty case.308 
White collar counsel can do the same by previewing mitigating 
evidence whenever possible.  For example, counsel should consider 
weaving mitigation evidence into a pre-indictment white paper or an 
attorney’s proffer to the government.309  Counsel may also consider 
seeking medical evaluations of their client early in a case if there is 
any indication of mental health problems or addiction.310  Precisely 
                                                            
 304. See Norton, supra note 277, at 45 (“The data must be integrated in such a way 
as to explain why the offense occurred and how all the factors came together to 
bring your client to the point of [committing that offense] . . . .  More important, 
you must explain why other [similarly situated persons] . . . did not [commit the 
offense].”). 
 305. See Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 21 (“Counsel should seek a 
[mitigation] theory that will be effective in connection with both guilt and penalty, 
and should seek to minimize inconsistencies.  The theme must be consistently 
applied to obtain resources, pursue motions, exclude evidence, [or] secure a plea 
agreement . . . .”). 
 306. See Haney, supra note 26, at 844 (“A mitigating counter-narrative that 
incorporates a capital defendant’s social history and immediate life circumstances is 
now recognized as the centerpiece of an effective [capital case].”); Sean D. O’Brien, 
Death Penalty Stories:  Lessons in Life Saving Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 831, 836 
(2009) (stating that “[t]he mitigation narrative must be presented in dealings with 
the prosecutor, selecting and instructing the jury, and the guilt/innocence stage of 
trial,” in addition to the penalty phase). 
 307. See Finnegan, supra note 12, at 58 (reporting that if the case had gone to trial, 
Kaczynski’s defense team would have offered evidence of multiple generational 
mental illness). 
 308. See Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 35, 36 n.1 (observing that the 
successful disposition was dependent on “tireless mitigation investigation”). 
 309. See Howard Sklamberg, What Really Works with Federal Prosecutors, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id 
=900005447640 (discussing the benefits of attorney proffer and most effective way 
to conduct one). 
 310. See Stetler, Mitigation Evidence, supra note 15, at 49 (providing a 
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when to share this type of information is a strategic decision for 
counsel, but it can be advantageous to present mitigation evidence 
early.  In any event, mitigation themes cannot wait to be developed 
until the sentencing hearing.  By then, it is difficult to alter the 
court’s perception of the defendant and his culpability.311 
In terms of the practical side of presenting mitigation evidence, 
capital defense counsel use two primary strategies that can be easily 
adopted by white collar attorneys.  First, in preparation for presenting 
a mitigation case, a capital defense team will “triangulate” mitigating 
data to ensure maximum thoroughness, accuracy, and reliability.312  
“Triangulation of data refers to obtaining data from more than one 
source and, preferably from more than one type of source.”313  In an 
ideal world, counsel would support all mitigating arguments with 
documentary evidence, lay testimony, and expert testimony.314  For 
example, to present evidence of a defendant’s gambling addiction, 
white collar counsel could “triangulate” the data by developing 
testimony about the defendant’s addiction from his family (lay 
testimony), his doctor or an addiction specialist (expert testimony), 
and through his financial records (documentary evidence).315  This 
approach is especially important because expert witnesses are often 
looked upon as “hired guns” —supporting their opinion-based 
testimony with first-hand accounts by family members and hard 
                                                            
comprehensive discussion of mental health testing and strategic decisions regarding 
its use). 
 311. See Haney, supra note 26, at 837–43 (explaining the prevalence and 
intractability of the crime master narrative in criminal cases); Ellen S. Podgor, The 
Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 740 (2007) 
(arguing that lack of sympathy from the general public makes white collar offenders 
“easy targets” for increased punishment); David Porter, Lawyer Gets Longest-Ever 
Insider Trading Sentence, BOSTON.COM (June 4, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/ 
nation/articles/2012/06/04/2_set_for_sentencing_in_insider_trading_case 
(discussing a former attorney sentenced to twelve years for insider trading scheme 
after judge called him “amoral” and “thuggish,” comparing him to drug dealer). 
 312. Norton, supra note 277, at 45. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 725–31 (demonstrating 
the key components of an optimal mitigation investigation). 
 315. Triangulation of data can also be compellingly used for positive mitigation 
evidence.  For example, instead of simply offering letters explaining the defendant’s 
good works (as most white collar defense attorneys do), counsel should support the 
letters with tax returns showing giving totals and awards for service by charitable 
organizations, as well as the testimony of one of the letter drafters.  By triangulating a 
single point of mitigating data, the entire “dataset” (all the sentencing letters) gains 
legitimacy.  If allowed by the court, an expert might also be called to testify as to the 
defendant’s low risk of recidivism; part of the testimony might highlight the 
defendant’s charitable works.  It is difficult for a judge to disregard mitigating 
evidence if it is supported by multiple pieces of evidence.  The sheer time mitigation 
evidence is in front of the court increases the chances the judge will consider it 
during the final sentencing determination. 
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documents creates a consistent and compelling mitigation 
argument.316  If a sentencing judge will not allow a full hearing in 
which to present mitigating evidence, affidavits may serve as a 
substitute for live testimony.317 
Second, capital defense counsel evaluate mitigation evidence they 
intend to present under the “Four Cs”:  credibility, 
comprehensiveness, consistency, and comprehensibility.318  Mitigation 
evidence is credible when all mitigation theories are supported by a 
thorough social history investigation backed-up by documents, lay 
witness testimony, and expert witness testimony.319  A mitigation case 
is comprehensive when it has been applied at every stage of the 
defense, including during discussions with the client, meetings with 
the government, in motions, and in court appearances.320  Consistent 
use of mitigation evidence occurs when defense counsel has 
formulated and communicated a “unified theory of the case that 
takes into account all the facts and circumstances of the client and 
the offense and tells the same story at every stage of the litigation.”321  
Mitigation evidence is comprehensible when it is presented in 
ordinary language and in a common sense manner.322  White collar 
counsel should evaluate their mitigation case under the same rubric. 
The fourth “C,” however, can be somewhat difficult to achieve 
when presenting the results of a detailed social history investigation.  
Experienced capital attorneys make liberal use of visual aids, 
particularly photos, videos, and physical objects (e.g., trophies, 
artwork, military medals), and key documents, such as earned 
certificates, favorable press accounts, and letters of praise, to 
humanize their clients.323  Demonstrative timelines of the client’s life 
                                                            
 316. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:  An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Law Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1997) (noting that some 
jurors perceive expert witnesses as “professional witnesses” being paid to testify 
favorably). 
 317. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2) (allowing defendant to introduce evidence on 
objections to the presentence investigation report). 
 318. See John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases:  Principles of 
Developing and Presenting Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, CHAMPION, Nov. 
2000, at 63, 69 (“Jurors must understand your evidence before they can accept your 
theory.  They also must believe it.  If they question the credibility of your evidence, 
they will likely stop listening and start resisting your theory.  Without doubt, for your 
evidence to be understood (comprehensible) by jurors, it must have a reliable 
foundation (credible), it must not come as a surprise (comprehensive) and it must not be 
used as an excuse only after all else has failed (consistent).”). 
 319. Id. at 63. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Schaye & Schaye-Glos, supra note 246, at 22. 
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history and genograms depicting multigenerational afflictions may 
also be appropriate.324  The effective deployment of these types of 
mitigation evidence in white collar cases is only limited by the 
combined imagination of the defense team. 
G. Strategy 7—Keep the Ultimate Goal in Mind 
Finally, white collar counsel cannot lose sight of the ultimate goal 
of mitigation—presenting the “diverse frailties of humankind” to the 
court in a way that humanizes the client and evokes sympathy at 
sentencing.325  This, however, does not mean mitigation evidence is a 
defense to prosecution or a “reason the client should get away with 
it.”326  White collar counsel, particularly in today’s negative corporate 
climate, must not be perceived as attempting to justify the crime 
committed.  Instead, mitigation should be viewed as a means of 
introducing evidence “which inspires compassion” and indicates 
capacity for redemption.327  Put simply, mitigation is an explanation, 
not an excuse. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question and a goal.  The question was 
whether two federal defendants with seemingly nothing in common 
other than their life terms—the nonviolent economic offender, 
Bernie Madoff, and the remorseless serial killer, Ted Kaczynski—
could learn from one another when it came to federal sentencing 
practices.  Was there a lesson for the CEO from the case of the 
condemned?  The answer to that question is a certain “yes.”  As seen 
from the discussion of the development of the mitigation function in 
capital cases—beginning with the Supreme Court’s Gregg decision 
and culminating with the Supplementary Guidelines—capital litigators 
                                                            
 324. Id.  A demonstrative timeline likely starts as a chronology consisting of 
narrative, historical accounts of the influences or events that have the most 
significant effect on the client’s life.  The chronology is continuously updated as new 
data is found, allowing the defense team to quickly locate facts, documents, physical 
evidence, and witnesses that are capable of communicating important aspects of the 
client’s life story.  The chronology is then converted into a demonstrative timeline.  
See O’Brien, When Life Depends on It, supra note 37, at 756–57 (discussing how 
chronologies create a narrative of the defendant’s life and how “life history 
diagrams” can be used during the penalty phase).  Genograms are “annotated family 
trees which depict the relationships between family members and patterns of 
impairments” within the client’s family.  Id. at 757 (quoting Norton, supra note 277, 
at 45).  They also help organize and display data “useful in explaining to juries the 
long-term effects of various influences on the client.”  Id. 
 325. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 326. See Stetler, Mystery of Mitigation, supra note 37, at 261. 
 327. Id. 
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and their teams of mitigation experts have mastered the use of 
mitigating social history evidence to “inspire compassion” at 
sentencing.  Following a parallel arc, white collar sentencing has 
undergone a series of seismic shifts, compelling counsel to develop 
new strategies to address the schizophrenic character of federal 
sentencing, which both subjects white collar offenders to harsh post-
Booker sentences and offers them opportunities to harness the 
expansive judicial sentencing discretion as clarified in Pepper.  The 
two sentencing worlds, and the worlds of Madoff and Kaczynski, 
merge over mitigation and its “transformative power” to impact a 
defendant’s sentence. 
This Article’s goal was to highlight new strategies and techniques 
available to white collar defendants and their counsel through the 
use of mitigation evidence and to enhance federal sentencing 
advocacy as a whole.  The first aspect of this goal was partially met by 
discussing seven strategies capital counsel use so effectively—
adopting a mitigation mindset, employing a team approach, 
beginning mitigation work early, better understanding the client by 
building trust, developing the most persuasive mitigation evidence, 
presenting a compelling mitigation case at sentencing, and keeping 
the ultimate goal in mind.  A deeper look at these and other key 
mitigation strategies is warranted.  Whether the second aspect of the 
goal will be met remains to be seen.  But if white collar attorneys do 
in fact learn from their capital counterparts, employing mitigation 
techniques in their cases and striving to understand and present their 
clients as complete individuals, we can all be hopeful. 
